Patent Prior Art and Possession by Holbrook, Timothy R.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 1 Article 4
Patent Prior Art and Possession
Timothy R. Holbrook
Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Prior Art and Possession, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 123 (2018),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol60/iss1/4
PATENT PRIOR ART AND POSSESSION
TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK*
ABSTRACT
Prior art in patent law defines the set of materials that the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and courts use to
determine whether the invention claimed in a patent is new and non-
obvious. One would think that, as a central, crucial component of
patent law, prior art would be thoroughly theorized and doctrinally
coherent. Nothing could be further from the truth. The prior art
provisions represent an ad hoc codification of various policies and
doctrines that arose in the courts.
This Article provides coherency to this morass. It posits a prior art
system that draws upon property law’s conception of possession.
Possession operates when an actor asserts dominion over a resource
or object in a way that communicates that assertion to third parties. 
In this way, public availability becomes the key lodestar to prior
art. In the prior art context, the possession framework would divide
prior art into two categories: prior art generated by third parties and
prior art generated by the patent applicant herself. The former would
require clear demonstration of publicly available information, sug-
gesting that current law is wrong. As for the latter, a possession
approach could treat inventor-generated material in the same way as
third-party prior art. Alternatively we could take a strict statute of
* Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs and Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory
University. My thanks for comments from Scott Boone, Yaniv Heled, Cynthia Ho, Mark Janis,
Dmitry Karshtedt, Mark Lemley, Joe Miller, Nicole Morris, David Oedel, Sean Seymore, Liza
Vertinsky, and Ramsi Woodcock. I presented earlier versions of this project at faculty work-
shops at Temple University Beasley School of Law and Tulane University Law School; the
Georgia Intellectual Property Scholars Workshop, the Emory/University of Georgia Law
Schools Joint Faculty Workshop, and the 2016 Vanderbilt Patent Roundtable. My thanks for
comments from those participants. © 2018 Timothy R. Holbrook.
123
124 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:123
limitations approach to inventor-created uses and commercialization
efforts, barring a patent if the inventor simply delays too long in
filing her application, regardless of the public accessibility. Sadly,
the status quo is an inconsistent blend of both. Finally, some forms
of “secret prior art” should be addressed through administrative
procedures.
The Article then assesses the advantages and disadvantages of
such a prior art system, concluding that the benefits outweigh any
disadvantages. It then also explores how patent law has done heavy
lifting in the context of possession and public accessibility that
property law has not. Patent law has more rigorously explored the
appropriate audience for receiving the communications of possession.
Property law stands to learn from patent law in this regard.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent law is a difficult and intimidating class for most law
students. The mix of technology, law, and economics can seem
daunting.1 Some concepts may make intuitive sense, at least at a
high level of generality. For example, the requirement that an
invention must be new, or novel, makes sense because we do not
want to award patents for things that have already been created.2
Similarly, the requirement that an invention must be more than a
trivial advance in the state of the art, in other words, non-obvious,3
is also easy to grasp, at least until the class jumps into the weeds of
the doctrine.4 Both novelty and nonobviousness are relative, how-
ever. An assessment of those criteria requires a comparison between
the invention as claimed in the patent and the “prior art,” the set of
information generally known to the hypothetical person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA).5
The definition of prior art is one area in which students usually
stumble.6 The statutory provisions are complex and have been
altered dramatically in the last few years. Under the Patent Act of
1952, prior art was defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102, which was, frankly,
a mess.7 There was no rational structure to its provisions; it was
merely a codification of previous judicial decisions arbitrarily listed
in no particular order.8 Prior art under the 1952 Patent Act was
devoid of any broader theoretical architecture that informed the
1. The difficulty should not discourage students, even those without technical
backgrounds, from taking a patent law or intellectual property course. See generally Timothy
R. Holbrook, Patents for Poets, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 795 (2008). 
2. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). See generally Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent
Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 930 (2011) (“A bedrock principle of patent law is that a patent cannot
issue if it would remove technology that is already in the public domain. The corollary is that
inventions ‘must be new, that is, bestowed for the first time upon the public by the patentee.’”
(citations omitted) (quoting 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS 305 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. ed., 1890)).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
4. See Holbrook, supra note 1, at 797-800.
5. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65
EMORY L.J. 987, 990-95 (2016).
6. See Holbrook, supra note 1, at 798.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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section.9 Given the lack of a theory, unsurprisingly many of the
provisions overlap, creating considerable confusion.10
Section 102 was amended significantly with the adoption of the
America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011.11 The AIA shifted the U.S. pat-
ent system from one that awarded patents to the “first-to-invent” to
one where the patent goes to the “first inventor to file” a patent
application on the invention.12 This move brought us closer to the
rest of the world as, before the AIA, the United States was the only
country to award patents to the first-to-invent.13 The AIA’s section
102 provides a clearer analytical structure, though it remains com-
plex.14 Additionally, while much of the language in section 102 has
an antecedent basis in the 1952 Patent Act,15 there remains consid-
erable debate about the scope of the various provisions.16 Given that
Congress imported much of the language in the AIA from the 1952
Patent Act,17 these terms also represent an ad hoc compilation of
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285-87
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
12. Id. § 3, 125 Stat. at 285.
13. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 950 (5th ed. 2016). 
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
15. See Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93
TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1135 (2015).
16. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Ltd., No. 11-3962 (MLC), 2016 WL
832089, at *51 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2016) (“[T]he post-AIA on-sale bar also requires that the sale
or offer for sale make the claimed invention available to the public.”), rev’d sub nom. Helsinn
Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138
S. Ct. 2678 (2018). Compare Lemley, supra note 16, at 1135 (“Congress did not change the
basic language establishing the core categories of prior art.”), and Robert P. Merges, Priority
and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1035 (2012) (“In terms of the AIA,
this means that an inventor’s non-informing public use or sale is a ‘disclosure’ under AIA
§ 102(a), by virtue of the facts that (1) the phrases ‘public use’ and ‘on sale’ in AIA § 102(a) im-
plicitly incorporate prior case law, including prior cases on an inventor’s own non-informing
uses; and (2) ‘disclosure’ in AIA § 102(b) means ‘any legitimate prior art reference under AIA
§ 102(a),’ which includes ‘public use’ and ‘on sale’ and therefore an inventor’s own non-
informing public use prior art.”), with Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents
Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 54 (2012) (“The overarching require-
ment for a disclosure to be ‘available to the public’ has been placed into new § 102(a)(1) in a
manner making it virtually impossible to read it other than as an express repudiation of the
Metallizing Engineering doctrine.”).
17. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 1135.
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previous judicial decisions.18 As such, there still is no true theory of
what constitutes prior art in patent law.
This state of affairs is problematic. The doctrines implementing
these statutory provisions continue to evolve through case law with
little theory to guide their development.19 This Article offers a the-
oretical construct that can unify the prior art categories and offer
important insights into their current and future development.
Drawing on the concept of “possession” from property law,20 this
Article suggests that prior art should be considered information
known either to the broader general public, when talking about
prior art generated by third parties, or to the particular patent
applicant. By asking “who possessed the information,” various poli-
cies and concerns become clear. Indeed, the AIA embraces aspects
of this approach: it excludes from prior art information generated by
the applicant within one year of her application filing, whereas
third-party prior art is not given this grace period.21
The concept of “possession” is central to, and pervasive through-
out, property law.22 The first to take possession of, or occupy, a wild
animal23 or abandoned property24 is the owner of the item. The first
to take possession of lost property is the “finder” and is thus a bailee
with an interest superior to all except for the true owner.25 One who
occupies and uses another’s land can become the true owner through
adverse possession.26
18. See id. at 1134-35.
19. See id.
20. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012).
22. See generally Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
73, 74 (1985) (“For the common law, possession or ‘occupancy’ is the origin of property.”).
23. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 176-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
24. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640
F.2d 560, 571 (5th Cir. 1981) (“As a general rule, under the law of finds, a finder acquires title
to lost or abandoned property by ‘occupancy’, i.e. by taking possession of the property and
exercising dominion and control over it.”).
25. See In re Savarino, 1 F. Supp. 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (“[T]he law has been settled
that the finder of a chattel becomes what may, perhaps, be aptly called a fortuitous bailee
thereof with such a property therein as enables him to keep it against all the world except its
rightful owner, and to defend it against all others with every remedy which is available to a
bailee.”).
26. See, e.g., Jake’s Granite Supplies, L.L.C. v. Beaver (In re Jake’s Granite Supplies,
L.L.C.) 442 B.R. 694, 699 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“Under Arizona law, a party claiming title, or in this
case compensation, for real property by adverse possession must show that his or her
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Carol Rose views possession in these contexts as a form of speech:
someone who is claiming the object is telling others that the object
is hers.27 Others have explored how possession acts as a statement
to third parties about ownership over the item at issue, which is
important given the in rem nature of property rights.28
These conceptions of possession also operate within patent law.29
A necessary prerequisite to either the first to invent or first inventor
to file regimes is that inventors possess the relevant inventions, as
demonstrated through their patent application.30 The patent statute
requires that applicants sufficiently disclose their inventions to
demonstrate that the applicants possessed their inventions as of the
filing date31 and to ensure that others in the relevant technological
field can make and use the claimed inventions without undue
experimentation.32 The extent of the disclosure also can impact the
scope of the rights afforded under the patent, both literally33 and
under the doctrine of equivalents.34 Indeed, given that the patent
system awards new property rights on a daily basis, allocating
rights to the winner of the patent race, possession has even more
salience in patent than in property law.35
Patent law is different than other forms of property, however, in
that merely winning the possession race against other competing
possession was exclusive, actual, open and notorious, hostile, under a claim of right, and con-
tinuous for the statutory period of ten years.”).
27. Rose, supra note 22, at 78-79.
28. See generally Holbrook, supra note 5, at 996-1006 (reviewing possession theory and
its application to patent law). 
29. See id. 
30. Cf. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer Review and Patent Law, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1825, 1831 (2016).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); see Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
32. § 112(a); see In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
33. See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 472 (1895); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 157-68 (2006).
34. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009). The doctrine of equivalents allows the patent to cover methods or
devices that, while not literally the same as what the patent claims, is nevertheless
insubstantially different in relevant part. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002) (“[A] patent protects its holder against efforts of
copyists to evade liability for infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a
patented invention.”).
35. See Holbrook, supra note 5, at 1005.
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inventors is insufficient to get a patent.36 The applicant also has to
“win the race” against what is already known.37 Patent applicants
must show not only that they are the first to possess the invention
by being the first to invent (under the 1952 Patent Act) or the first
to file (under the AIA), but also that they are the first to possess the
invention ever, relative to what is publicly known within the rele-
vant field of technology.38
Elsewhere I have explored how the use of possession informs the
doctrines of anticipation and obviousness, positively and norma-
tively.39 In essence, both of these doctrines require the applicant to
demonstrate that the public was not yet in possession of the claimed
invention.40 The doctrines of novelty and obviousness, therefore, de-
lineate the “thing” that is the subject of possession, the invention.41
Possession goes beyond simply the “thing,” both in the property
and patent contexts. To constitute possession, the possessor’s acts
must communicate the exercise of dominion to third parties by some
public act.42 Prior art in patent law—the set of materials against
which the novelty and nonobviousness are assessed—also generally
requires some level of public accessibility.43 The possession lens
therefore provides “a theoretical basis for investigating what
[information] should count as ‘prior art.’”44 In other words, novelty
and obviousness are concerned with the sufficiency of the posses-
sion. Prior art doctrines, on the other hand, relate to the communi-
cative function: the communicative act must be sufficiently public
to be considered an act of possession, regardless of whether the prior
art sufficiently discloses the invention.45 The statutory provision
36. See id. at 1005-06.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 1005.
40. Id. at 994 (“Another way to think about novelty and non-obviousness, therefore, is to
say that, to get a patent, the invention cannot already be within the possession of the
public.”).
41. See id. at 1006.
42. See id. at 989.
43. See id. at 1010-11.
44. See id. at 995 n.31.
45. See id. at 1010-11.
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governing prior art under both the 1952 Patent Act and America
Invents Act is 35 U.S.C. § 102.46
This Article offers a novel exploration of the prior art provisions
of both patent acts and advances a new theoretical perspective on
prior art, based on the concept of “possession.” This piece is par-
ticularly timely because the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) and the courts are confronting the new prior art
provisions of the AIA.47 As we transition from the 1952 Patent Act’s
ad hoc definitions of prior art, as confusingly enumerated in 35
U.S.C. § 102,48 to the AIA’s new, more logical, and yet more complex
structure,49 this Article’s interrogation of prior art is timely and
important. It serves to answer some lingering questions about the
scope and purpose of section 102 of the 1952 Patent Act while
offering insight and potential answers to the issues that will be
forthcoming under the AIA section 102.
Until recently, few scholars have considered the role of possession
as it applies to intellectual property law.50 Indeed, some have ques-
tioned its applicability.51 This piece continues my ongoing project of
exploring the role of possession in patent law and how the ideas
surrounding possession in the property context can inform patent
law and doctrine. In my first article, I primarily looked at the role
of the patent disclosure in demonstrating that an applicant had
possession of the relevant invention.52 In the second article, I fur-
ther elaborated the manner in which “possession” operates as a
lever for tailoring the scope of patent protection, particularly when
a device accused of infringing is not the same as the claimed
invention but is trivially different, or, in patent parlance, is an
equivalent.53 The third explored the doctrines of anticipation and
obviousness as relating to actual and constructive possession,
respectively.54 
46. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
47. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), amended by 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
50. See, e.g., Ouellette, supra note 30, at 1826; Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret
Precautions, Possession, and Notice, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 361 (2017).
51. See infra Part IV.B. 
52. See Holbrook, supra note 33, at 146.
53. See Holbrook, supra note 34, at 36-45.
54. See Holbrook, supra note 5, at 987-88, 994-95.
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This Article builds on this earlier work by using the concept of
possession to unify the various prior art doctrines and offer pre-
scriptive insights as to current and future doctrine. Surprisingly,
little academic attention has been paid to determining what set of
materials is appropriate for determining whether an invention is
novel or nonobvious.55 Such oversight is surprising given that, to
assess novelty and nonobviousness, the fact finder must necessarily
determine what prior art is relevant.56 The literature may have
overlooked this dynamic in large part because, unlike much of
patent law, what constitutes “prior art” is mandated by section 102
of the Patent Act.57
Such abdication is inappropriate. While the statute does list
various categories of prior art, the language of section 102 remains
vague, requiring judicial interpretation to add flesh to the provi-
sions.58 Also, the hodgepodge nature of the statutory provisions
suggests that something is amiss: there has not been a comprehen-
sive consideration of what should constitute prior art and whether
the present statutory schemes satisfy any perceived needs.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
statutory provisions that govern prior art both under the 1952
Patent Act and the AIA. Part II provides an overview of property’s
conception of possession and explores its application in the patent
context, particularly with respect to prior art. Part III then interro-
gates the prior art provisions and doctrines using the lens of posses-
sion. It breaks prior art into three broad categories: third-party
generated prior art; inventor-generated prior art; and miscellaneous
55. Commentators have paid some attention to specific prior art issues, such as the on-
sale bar. See David W. Carstens & Craig Allen Nard, Conception and the “On Sale” Bar, 34
WM. & MARY L. REV. 393 (1993); Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More
They Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for
Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 933, 938-39 (2000); Stephen
Bruce Lindholm, Comment, Revisiting Pfaff and the On-Sale Bar, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
213, 215 (2004). Regarding the geographic limits on certain forms of prior art in the United
States, see Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior
Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 679-86 (2003). For a discussion of inherent
anticipation by the prior art, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 371 (2005); Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent
Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101 (2008).
56. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
57. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
58. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 57, 60-61, 63-64 (1998).
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forms of prior art that do not readily fit into either of those catego-
ries. Part IV then aggregates the lessons of Part III to describe a
prior art regime that would be consistent with possession principles,
and then evaluates whether society would actually want such an
approach. Part V then assesses the current property literature on
possession and offers lessons that property could learn from patent
law. In particular, patent law has wrestled with the issue of
whether the communicative act has been sufficiently public to the
relevant audience in a way that the courts in the property context
have not. Patent law’s PHOSITA construct demonstrates the
importance of the audience in any theory of possession. A conclusion
follows.
I. THE MORASS THAT IS PRIOR ART DOCTRINE
Defining what constitutes “prior art” is a critical aspect of the
gatekeeping function performed by the USPTO and the federal
courts, ensuring that patents are awarded for only merit-worthy
inventions.59 Novelty and nonobviousness are necessarily relative:
the invention must be compared to what came before it.60 Prior art
provides this basis of comparison.61 Given the centrality of prior art,
one would expect the law to be clear and straightforward.
Such intuition would be wrong. Under the 1952 Patent Act, the
statutory provision governing the definition of prior art is an ad hoc
codification of prior case law with no clear structural or policy
design.62 The AIA, in contrast, offers a more refined structure to
prior art, although its primary provisions were copied verbatim from
one provision of the 1952 Patent Act.63
Indeed, further complicating matters is the fact that we currently
have two patent systems in the United States. While the AIA’s prior
59. Randall Erickson, What is Prior Art?, ERICKSON L. GRP., PC, http://www.erickson
lawgroup.com/law/patents/patentfaq/what-is-prior-art/ [https://perma.cc/WR89-88B7].
60. See §§ 102(a), 103.
61. See id. §§ 102(a), 103.
62. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
63. The types of prior art under section 102(a) of the AIA are the same as those of
section 102(b) of the 1952 Patent Act, with the addition of the language “otherwise available
to the public.” Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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art provisions came into force in March 2013,64 any application filed
before the AIA’s effective date is governed by the 1952 Patent Act.65
Thus, until at least 2033 (i.e., twenty years from the date of those
applications filed immediately before the transition to the AIA), the
United States will have patents governed by both the 1952 Patent
Act and the AIA.66 Interpretations of the 1952 Act’s prior art provi-
sions will continue, meaning they will be dynamic.67 And the courts
have just begun to consider the meaning of the AIA.68 Affording any
sort of theoretical coherence to this situation is highly desirable.
This Part will first explore section 102 under the 1952 Patent Act
and then will explain the operation of the AIA section 102. Next, it
turns to consideration of how, in theory, prior art should be mea-
suring whether the invention has been created already in the sense
that the applicant or inventor is in possession of the invention. It
explores how this metric should be defined, drawing on ideas of
enablement and reduction to practice. It then turns this framework
onto both Acts to offer insight into these provisions.
A. The Kitchen Sink of the 1952 Patent Act’s Section 102
Section 102 of the 1952 Patent Act is, to be kind, unruly. It con-
tains seven subsections that reflect a compilation of different rules
and timing provisions that define whether certain acts constitute
prior art.69 For example, even though the United States was gen-
erally a “first-to-invent” regime under the 1952 Patent Act,70 other
provisions—called statutory bars—are instead tied to the filing date
of a patent application and not the date of invention.71 Even the
first-to-invent and statutory bar provisions are dispersed in
64. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2151 (9th ed., rev. 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2100.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q5XY-S449].
65. See id. § 2159.01.
66. The term of a patent is twenty years from the filing date. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)
(2012).
67. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016).
69. See Holbrook, supra note 33, at 151; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
70. See § 102(a), (g) (tying availability of a patent to the date of invention).
71. See id. § 102(b), (d) (tying availability of a patent to the filing date). 
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different subsections.72 Sections 102(a), (e), (f), and (g) are all first-
to-invent provisions, while sections 102(b) and (d) are statutory
bars.73 One might think that Congress would have organized the
section into two distinct parts—the first-to-invent provisions in one
part and the statutory bars in another—but Congress failed to do
so.74
The nature of the first-to-invent provisions and the statutory bars
also means that the performers of the various acts differ. For the
first-to-invent provisions, only activities by third parties could qual-
ify as prior art: it would be impossible for the inventor to disclose
the invention in some way before she invented it.75 In contrast, the
statutory bars, such as those in section 102(b), apply to activities by
both third parties and the inventor herself.76 Finally, section 102(d),
which deals with delays by an inventor in filing in the United States
after filing abroad, applies only to the inventor herself.77
72. See id. § 102(a), (b), (d)-(g).
73. See id.
74. Although not relevant to this discussion, § 102 also had different territorial restric-
tions based on the nature of the activity. See id. § 102(a)-(b), (f). See Timothy R. Holbrook,
Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the United States to Sell an Inven-
tion Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 709-11 (2004) (discussing various provisions of § 102
that implicate foreign activity). The AIA eliminated these territorial restrictions. Printed
publications and patents counted as prior art regardless of where in the world they were
located, whereas public uses and on-sale activity were limited to acts within the United
States. Compare § 102(a)-(b) (noting relevance of patents and printed publications “in this or
a foreign country”), with § 102(f) (lacking any territorial distinction or limitation). See 35
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
75. Absent time travel. 
76. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
77. See id. § 102(d).
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The below chart summarizes the various provisions of section
10278:
Section
Activity Constituting
Prior Art
Trigger date(s)
Third party,
inventor, or
both
102(a)
Patent; printed publica-
tion; known or used by
others
Invention date Third party
102(b)
Patent; printed publica-
tion; public use; on-sale
Critical date Both
102(c) Abandonment Unclear Inventor
102(d)
Foreign filing > 12
months before U.S. fil-
ing, and foreign patent
issues before U.S. filing
Critical date/fil-
ing date
Inventor
102(e)(1)
Application filed before
(1) invention date; and
(2) application published
Invention date Third party
102(e)(2)
Application filed before
(1) invention date; and
(2) patent issued
Invention date Third party
102(f)
Enabling communica-
tion from inventor to
applicant
Invention date Third party
102(g)(2)
Other first-to-invent
(first to conceive) and
either first to reduce to
practice or second to
reduce to conception but
with diligence; cannot
abandon, suppress, or
conceal
Invention date Third party
78. Id. § 102. Section 102(c) appears to be a vestigial provision that suggests an inventor
can lose the patent prior to filing an application even in circumstances where a statutory bar
does not apply. See 2A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.03 (2018). The provision
has been rarely applied, and the AIA eliminated this form of prior art. Id.
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This ad hoc collection of statutory provisions generally reflects a
codification of earlier case law.79 As one can see, section 102 of the
1952 Patent Act lacks a coherent structure.
B. The AIA’s Alterations to the Statutory Definition of Prior Art
When Congress adopted the AIA in 2011, it significantly re-
worked the way the United States’s patent system operates. Instead
of awarding patents primarily to the first to invent,80 the first
inventor to file a patent application generally will get the patent
under the AIA.81 This change brought United States’s patent law
more closely into alignment with all other countries in the world,
who have long awarded the patent to the first to file.82 United States
law still diverges from other patent systems, however, because the
later applicant may yet obtain the patent if the earlier applicant
obtained the invention from the later applicant: one cannot steal the
invention, win the race to the patent office, and get the patent.83 In
this scenario, the first applicant is not truly an inventor.
This change to a first-inventor-to-file system necessitated a
change to the definitions of prior art. The AIA overhauled section
102, making it generally more coherent, albeit more complex, than
the provisions in the 1952 Patent Act. Section 102(a) of the AIA
provides the default definition of prior art.84 Section 102(a)(1)
defines as prior art any patent or printed publication that discloses
the invention, a public use of the invention, or an offer to sell the
79. See Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 315 (1833) (disqualifying inventions used in foreign
countries from receiving a U.S. patent); Collins v. Emerson, 82 F.2d 197, 201 (1st Cir. 1936)
(classifying disclosure of the invention in a printed publication more than two years prior as
prior art); Kear v. Roder, 115 F.2d 810, 818 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (making disclosure of an invention
in a printed publication within the United States or any foreign jurisdiction more than one
year prior to the patent application an absolute bar to issuing the patent).
80. As discussed supra, the statutory bars at times will preclude a patent for someone,
even if they are the first to invent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); supra note 76 and
accompanying text. Additionally, the second to invent can be awarded the patent if the first
to invent abandoned, suppressed, or concealed the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). 
81. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
82. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits
on the United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2004).
83. See § 102(b).
84. Id. § 102(a).
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invention, so long the activity occurs before the filing date.85 These
four provisions come directly from the statutory bars of section
102(b) of the 1952 Patent Act.86 Section 102(a)(1) adds a fifth cate-
gory, where the invention is “otherwise available to the public.”87
Unlike the 1952 Patent Act, there is no per se grace period within
the definition of prior art.88
Section 102(a)(2) relates to the first-to-file aspect of the system.89
It notes that an earlier filed patent application qualifies as prior art,
so long as the application is published or the patent issues.90 This
language tracks section 102(e) of the 1952 Patent Act, although it
changes the trigger date from the invention date to the filing date.91
Under the AIA, section 102(b) defines the exceptions to the default
definitions of prior art offered in section 102(a).92 Certain disclosures
that qualify under section 102(a) will not actually be prior art if they
fall within the delineated exceptions.93 In parallel fashion, section
102(b)(1) defines the exceptions to section 102(a)(1), and section
102(b)(2) creates the exceptions to section 102(a)(2).94 
Section 102(b)(1) has two subsections, (A) and (B).95 The former
excludes from prior art any “disclosure ... made by the inventor or
joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter dis-
closed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor”
made “1 year or less” from the filing date.96 In this way, the AIA
works very similarly to the 1952 Patent Act for disclosures that
have their genesis with the inventors.97 Section 102(b)(1)(A) gives
the inventor a one-year grace period to file an application when any
potentially invalidating disclosure under section 102(a)(1) is made.98
85. Id. § 102(a)(1).
86. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
88. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
90. See id.
91. Compare id., with 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).
92. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id. § 102(b)(1)(A)-(B).
96. Id. § 102(b)(1)(A).
97. Compare id. § 102, with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A) (2012).
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Section 102(b)(1)(B) works somewhat differently. This provision
excludes as prior art disclosures made by third parties if “the sub-
ject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly
disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained
the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor
or a joint inventor” within one year of the filing date.99 This
somewhat odd provision—one that makes United States law unique
(again) in the world—effectively allows an inventor to antedate
third-party prior art if the inventor had previously disclosed the
invention publicly before the prior art reference, or if a third party
who took the invention from the inventor disclosed it before the
reference.100 Section 102(b)(1)(B) effectively makes the United States
system a “first-inventor-to-file-or-disclose” regime. This opportunity
to antedate a third party reference, however, is limited to one year:
if the inventor publicly discloses the invention more than a year
before filing an application, then that disclosure will serve as prior
art under section 102(a)(1).101
Section 102(b)(2) creates exceptions to the first-to-file rule
delineated under section 102(a)(2).102 Section 102(b)(2)(A) excludes
an earlier filed patent application if “the subject matter disclosed
was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint
inventor.”103 This provision is similar to section 102(f) of the 1952
Patent Act, which precluded patent protection if the applicant had
taken the idea, or, in patent parlance, derived the invention, from
another inventor.104 This provision goes to the “first-inventor-to-file”
aspect of the AIA by excluding the earlier filed patent application
99. Id. § 102(b)(1)(B).
100. See id.
101. See generally KIMBERLY A. MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 678-84
(5th ed. 2018) (offering various examples of how earlier disclosures by an applicant would
antedate other references, but could still be used to invalidate the patent if published more
than a year before the filing date).
102. § 102(b)(2).
103. Id. § 102(b)(2)(A).
104. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006) (denying a patent if the applicant “did not himself invent the
subject matter sought to be patented.”). Of course, it differs because the act of derivation
removes the earlier filed application as prior art, but it does not define derivation as a form
of prior art. Compare id., with 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(A) (2012).
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as prior art against the second filer if the first filer “stole” the in-
vention.105
Section 102(b)(2)(B) operates similarly to the “first-to-invent-or-
disclose” dynamic discussed for section 102(b)(1)(B).106 An earlier
filed patent will not qualify as prior art if, prior to the filing date of
the earlier application, the invention was “publicly disclosed by the
inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject
matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint
inventor.”107 So, an inventor can antedate an earlier filed application
if she shows that she publicly disclosed the invention beforehand.108
Although section 102(b)(2)(B) does not have a one-year time limit,109
any disclosure by the inventor more than a year prior to her filing
date would serve as prior art under section 102(a)(1).110 So, even
though the earlier filed patent would not be prior art against her
application, her own disclosure would be.111
Finally, section 102(b)(2)(C) excludes an earlier filed application
if “the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not later
than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned
by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the
same person.”112 For example, suppose I file an application, and it
turns out that another inventor at my employer, Emory University,
submitted an application on the same subject matter before I did. If
we both are obligated to assign the patent to Emory, then the earlier
application will not count as prior art against me.
This provision is an expansion of what existed under the 1952
Patent Act. Under that act, 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) excluded certain
forms of prior art “where the subject matter and the claimed inven-
tion were, at the time the claimed invention was made, owned by
the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the
same person.”113 This provision applied only to prior art for obvious-
105. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012).
106. See id. § 102(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B).
107. Id. § 102(b)(2)(B).
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. See id. § 102(a)(1).
111. MOORE ET AL., supra note 101, at 678-84.
112. § 102(b)(2)(C).
113. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(1) (2006). 
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ness purposes, however.114 By creating an exclusion as to all prior
art, the AIA expanded the reach of this exclusion to both anticipa-
tion and obviousness.115
The statutory provisions under both the 1952 Patent Act and the
AIA defining prior art remain complex. The skeletal statutory
language of the 1952 Patent Act has resulted in considerable ju-
dicial gloss not apparent from the statute itself.116 The AIA took that
language directly from the 1952 Patent Act but provided no guid-
ance.117 As such, considering prior art through the theoretical frame
of possession is timely as the courts begin to determine the extent
to which the AIA departs from, or merely incorporates, the pre-AIA
case law.
The AIA structure distinguishes acts by the inventor from those
of third parties. In some regards, this distinction makes sense. The
inventor is in full control of any disclosures of the invention as well
as the filing of the application. We may want to create obligations
on, and opportunities for, inventors in terms of developing and
disclosing the invention. In contrast, inventors likely are not privy
to the knowledge of third parties until it becomes publicly avail-
able.118 Thus, the nature of the prior art depends on who created it,
which can impact how we view the act of possession. Inventors, as
the lowest cost avoider in these circumstances, may have additional
burdens in terms of promptly filing their patent application.119
The requirement for public accessibility maps onto property law’s
conception of possession, where a claimant must perform some sort
of communicative act to third parties to stake their claim over some
item.120 The next Part explores the theoretical construction of pos-
session and how it relates to patent law.
114. Id.
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) (2012).
116. See Gerner v. Moog Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 56, 58-59 (8th Cir. 1967) (holding that a
patent for shock absorber component could constitute prior art for an application for a dif-
ferent use of that component, like a steering column); Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. Rubber Teck,
Inc., 266 F.2d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 1959) (addressing how much improvement over a prior inven-
tion is enough to call something an invention distinct from prior art to be patentable).
117. See § 102; supra note 17 and accompanying text.
118. See § 102(b).
119. See, e.g., supra note 80-81.
120. See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 160 (D. Mass. 1881) (stating that killing a whale and leav-
ing marks of “appropriation” was enough to establish a claim of ownership).
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II. POSSESSION, PROPERTY, AND PATENTS
Patent lawyers and litigators routinely talk about prior art as
subject matter that is in the “public domain.”121 Such generalization
masks the complexity of the statutory regime, as well as the am-
biguities in what is considered public. The requirement for some
sort of “publicness” for most forms of prior art invites comparison to
property law’s conceptions of possession.122
Possession has been central to real and personal property since
the time of the Romans.123 Some commentators view it as the origin
of property.124 Possession acts as a way of demarcating what items
are generally owned among competing claimants.125 Given the in
rem nature of property, any claim of property must be communi-
cated to third parties, who may be strangers to the claimant.126 Mere
intent—a mental state—alone is insufficient.127
As Carol Rose has noted, possession is “a kind of communication,
and the original claim to the property looks like a kind of speech,
with the audience composed of all others who might be interested in
claiming the object in question.”128 Henry Smith similarly recognized
the salience that possession has for coordinating interests among
competing claimants: “[P]ossession is the basic module, in the sense
of a regime connecting persons to objects for purposes of rights
availing against others.”129 Possession in the property context
121. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
122. See infra Part III.
123. See Thomas J. McSweeney, Property Before Property: Romanizing the English Law of
Land, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1139, 1160 (2012); see also Yun-Chien Chang, Introduction, to LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 1, 1, 4 (Yun-Chien Chang ed., 2015) (“Possession is a two-
thousand-year old institution.”). 
124. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1221
(1979) (discussing property rights and exclusive possession); Thomas W. Merrill, Ownership
and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION, supra note 123, at 9, 12 (noting that
common law systems “exhibit a tendency to treat possession and ownership at least implicitly
as interchangeable concepts”); Rose, supra note 22, at 75.
125. See Ghen, 8 F. at 160-61.
126. See Varadarajan, supra note 50, at 382.
127. Id. (“Intent alone will not do. Because of the notice or signaling function of possession,
the claimant must engage in affirmative, observable acts with regard to the resource.”).
128. Rose, supra note 22, at 78-79.
129. Henry E. Smith, The Elements of Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION,
supra note 123, at 65, 80.
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therefore requires communication to third parties—the relevant
public.
The case law bears this observation out. The classic case of
Pierson v. Post, a dispute over a fox pelt, hinged on who first “pos-
sess[ed]” the wild fox.130 The court was split between two theories.
The majority adopted a rule that would award the fox (or any wild
animal) to the first person to physically possess the fox, to trap the
fox, or to mortally wound the fox while in pursuit; mere pursuit
alone was insufficient.131 The dissent would have awarded the fox to
the hunter who had a “reasonable prospect ... of taking” the ani-
mal.132 The majority rule provided the requisite communication to
third parties: clear acts demarcating the animal as someone else’s.133
The dissent’s rule, however, would have created considerable am-
biguity as to what constituted a “reasonable prospect ... of taking,”
which would have depended on factors that may not have been
perceptible to third parties.134 The Pierson story is also not a “labor-
reward” story, where the property right goes to the person whose
exertion justifies the property award: Pierson was the “saucy
intruder” who jumped in at the last minute to kill the fox and take
it away.135 The act of possession is a clear statement to third parties;
it is not meant to reward effort.136
Haslem v. Lockwood is to similar effect, although it sounds in
labor theory as well, in contrast with Pierson.137 In Haslem, a dis-
130. 3 Cai. 175, 176-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
131. Id. at 179. Technically the latter two conditions are dicta because Pierson actually
killed the fox and carried it away. Id. at 178 (“The foregoing authorities are decisive to show
that mere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox, but that he became the property of
Pierson, who intercepted and killed him.” (emphasis added)). 
132. Id. at 182 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (“[P]roperty in animals feræ naturæ may be
acquired without bodily touch or manucaption, provided the pursuer be within reach, or have
a reasonable prospect (which certainly existed here) of taking, what he has thus discovered
an intention of converting to his own use.”).
133. Id. at 178 (majority opinion).
134. Id. at 182 (Livingston, J., dissenting); see Rose, supra note 22, at 76-77 (“The problem
with assigning ‘possession’ prior to the kill is, of course, that we need a principle to tell us
when to assign it. Shall we assign it when the hunt begins? When the hunter assembles his
dogs for the hunt? When the hunter buys his dogs?”). 
135. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 181 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (describing Pierson as “a saucy
intruder, who had not shared in the honours or labours of the chase”).
136. Rose, supra note 22, at 77 (“The clear-act principle suggests that the common law
defines acts of possession as some kind of statement.”).
137. 37 Conn. 500, 506 (1871).
2018] PATENT PRIOR ART AND POSSESSION 145
pute arose over the ownership of manure.138 The plaintiff swept up
the abandoned droppings of a third party into “heaps” but left them;
the defendant then came and took the manure away.139 The plaintiff
ultimately prevailed as the manure had become his property.140
Although the decision resonates with aspects of Lockean labor
theory,141 it is also important to the reasoning that, by putting the
manure into piles, the plaintiff had altered the manure’s natural
state.142 A third party could observe this change in the manure’s
state and should recognize that someone else has claimed the
manure as his property.143 The manure did not naturally land in the
heaps, sending a sufficient signal of possession to the public that
someone was asserting dominion over it.144 Thus, under property
law, possession requires an act that communicates to the public that
the party is exerting its dominion over the item.145 It is a form of
public notice.
Possession in the property context thus has two necessary
elements. First, there must be some item over which a party is
asserting dominion.146 Second, the party must act in a way to
138. Id. at 505.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 507.
141. Id. at 506 (“[T]he plaintiff had changed its original condition and greatly enhanced its
value by his labor.”).
142. Id. at 507; see also Richard Keck & Damon Goode, Of Misappropriated Manure Heaps,
Rude Robots and Broken Promises: The (D)evolving Law of Database Protection, 57 BUS. LAW.
513, 514-15 (2001); Theodore J. Westbrook, Comment, Owned: Finding a Place for Virtual
World Property Rights, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 792-94 (“A common theme present in these
cases is that one who has expended labor in the acquisition of a good is entitled to it over one
who has expended little or no labor in its acquisition.”).
143. Haslem, 37 Conn. at 507.
144. Carol M. Rose, The Law Is Nine-Tenths of Possession: An Adage Turned on Its Head,
in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION, supra note 123, at 40, 50 (“Evidently, the piled-up
status of the manure was supposed to be a sufficient signal of the plaintiff ’s claim.”); Richard
A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Possession, 86 VA. L. REV. 535,
561-62 (2000) (“He took possession of it by raking it into heaps, and the heaps were adequate
notice to third parties, such as the defendant, that the manure was (no longer) abandoned.”);
Varadarajan, supra note 50, at 382-83; see also Tsu-Man Peter Tu, Note, Computer Software
Copyright Infringement, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 412, 440 n.144 (1994) (“This Lockean labor
theory of property is age-old. [See, e.g., Haslem, 37 Conn. at 506-07] (holding that a plaintiff
who raked manure into heaps has property rights in manure because he greatly increased its
value by his labor). It is, however, nevertheless inadequate.”).
145. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
146. See Merrill, supra note 124, at 11 (“For these nineteenth-century commentators, pos-
session refers to a particular relationship between a person and a thing.”); Rose, supra note
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communicate this exercise of control to third parties.147 When these
elements are satisfied, then a tangible object is said to be in the
possession of the particular party.148
The first condition—the thing—refers to a physical object.149 As
a result, some commentators have suggested that possession does
not operate in the world of intangibles, such as with patents and
other forms of intellectual or intangible property.150 These commen-
tators are focused only on one particular aspect of patent law: the
patent itself.151
These critiques are not persuasive as they fail to consider the full
panoply of issues within the realm of patent law. To begin with,
they ignore the importance of patent law’s disclosure obligations,
which act to demonstrate that the inventor was in possession of the
invention as claimed.152 The disclosure describes the invention and,
as a public document, communicates to the world what the inventor
has claimed.153 These critiques also ignore the various predicate acts
required to obtain a patent that can operate like possession. Indeed,
Carol Rose acknowledges that the concept of possession has salience
with respect to the act of invention.154 Because conception is a key
aspect of determining the act of invention, possession necessarily
implicates prior art and the “winner” of the patent race. Moreover,
144, at 50 (noting that there must be a “thing claimed”). 
147. Merrill, supra note 124, at 11 (noting that for possession, one must “behav[e] in such
a way that others recognize that he or she intends to maintain control over the thing”); Rose,
supra note 144, at 50 (“[L]egal possession consists of signals—signals that the claimant in-
tends to do something (though it is not clear what) with the thing claimed.”); Rose, supra note
22, at 78-79; see also Smith, supra note 129, at 81 (“Possession law, like all law, is a form of
communication.”).
148. See supra note 147.
149. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 124, at 25.
150. See id. (“Possession is limited to tangible objects, that is, things that have physical
dimensions.... [O]ne cannot possess intangible rights, such as future interests, security inter-
ests, intellectual property rights, bank account balances, or shares of stock in a corporation.”).
151. See, e.g., id.
152. Holbrook, supra note 33, at 127; see Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“In other words, the test for sufficiency is whether the
disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the
inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”).
153. Holbrook, supra note 5, at 987, 990.
154. Rose, supra note 144, at 44 (“De facto possession without more says nothing about how
the possessor got the property, whereas for legal title, that issue is exceedingly important if
not essential. Does a property claim arise from some version of first or original possession,
like discovery or invention?”). 
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additional literature shows that people can feel as if they possess
intangibles.155 As such, the application of possession theory to
intangibles—and thus to patent law—is possible and, indeed,
appropriate.
In fact, third-party prior art, at a general level, tracks the re-
quirements of possession strikingly well. First, the prior art must
disclose the invention in whole or in part,156 which corresponds to
the “thing” to be possessed in the tangible property context.157 The
requirements of novelty and nonobviousness can be explained
through conceptions of possession.158 Anticipation requires an en-
abling disclosure, which demonstrates that the prior art, and thus
the public, was in possession of the invention.159 Similarly, an
invention is obvious when the public is effectively, or constructively,
in possession of the claimed invention because the person having
ordinary skill in the art could readily make the claimed invention
based on the aggregate knowledge in the art.160 These doctrines
govern the first aspect of possession: identifying the “thing” that
someone is attempting to possess.
The focus in this Article is on the second aspect of possession: the
requirement for communication to the public. The lodestar of third-
party prior art has been public accessibility, such that the public
must have been able to find the art generally, even if finding it
would be difficult.161 Thus, the prior art must be able to communi-
cate the content of its disclosure to the PHOSITA, our proxy for the
public.162 The requirement for public accessibility thus tracks direct-
ly onto possession’s communication requirement. The following Part
explores the concept of possession and how it can inform our under-
155. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, What Behavioral Studies Can Teach Jurists About
Possession and Vice Versa, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION, supra note 123, at 128,
130-35 (noting the endowment effect for intangible things and arguing that “behavioral
studies cast doubt on the assumption that ‘possession’ necessarily requires a significant
physical component.”).
156. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
158. See generally Holbrook, supra note 5, at 1006-12 (describing the relationship between
patent anticipation and possession).
159. Seymore, supra note 2, at 931-32.
160. See Holbrook, supra note 5, at 1029.
161. See id.
162. For a brief discussion of the role of the PHOSITA see infra notes 480-94 and
accompanying text.
148 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:123
standing of prior art, offering descriptive and prescriptive insights
into current doctrine.
III. PATENT PRIOR ART AND POSSESSION
Assessments of both novelty and nonobviousness require a basis
of comparison. The basis of that comparison is the prior art, which,
at least with respect to third-party activities, is limited to publicly
available information.163 Of course, that need not be the case. An in-
vention’s novelty and nonobviousness could be absolute: one would
not get a patent (or an extant patent would be invalid) if the
invention or obvious variants had been created before the relevant
time of comparison, regardless of whether that information was
publicly available. Trade secrets,164 for example, would be able to
invalidate a patent, regardless of who possessed the secret and
whether it was publicly available. While finding such secret prior
art might be difficult as a practical matter, one could envision such
a system. But we have never had such a prior art regime.165
Prior art generally takes two forms: a tangible embodiment of the
claimed invention, or a written disclosure of it.166 Under the former
type of prior art, the creation of the physical instantiation of the
invention demonstrates possession.167 Under the latter, which in-
cludes earlier patents, printed publications, and sales of the inven-
tion based on a written description of the invention, the reference
must individually provide an enabling disclosure in order to
anticipate the invention or, in combination with other references,
render the invention obvious.168 The enablement requirement acts
as the lever for demonstrating possession: the disclosure must show
how to make the claimed invention.169
163. I address inventor-generated prior art and the somewhat hybrid derivation proceed-
ings in Parts III.B and III.C, infra. 
164. For a brief discussion of trade secrecy, see infra text accompanying notes 488-92.
165. See Holbrook, supra note 5, at 1011.
166. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
169. See generally Holbrook, supra note 5, at 990-1001 (explaining the connection between
patent law and possession). 
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The AIA created another category of prior art when the invention
was “otherwise available to the public.”170 This Part will also explore
that vague catch-all provision and examine what might be reason-
able to include as that sort of prior art, such as oral disclosures.171
For all forms of prior art, the reference must be accessible to the
public, which is consistent with the requirements of possession
theory.172 Part IV will review the different types of third-party prior
art and demonstrate how consistent they are with possession con-
cepts.
To further explore how prior art comports—or fails to com-
port—with conceptions of possession, the Article divides prior art
into three categories. The first is prior art created by third
parties.173 In other words, this is information generated by someone
other than the patent applicant or patent holder. Within this first
category are two subcategories: activities where a third party has
physically created the invention,174 and activities where the third
party discloses the invention in written form.175
The second category is prior art generated by the applicant or
patent holder herself.176 In this context, something the inventor has
created will preclude the patent. The category of applicant-gener-
ated prior art is also subdivided into tangible creations and written
descriptions of the invention.
I make this initial split between third-party and inventor prior
art for two reasons. Under the 1952 Patent Act, various doctrines
have evolved that treat third-party prior art differently from that of
the inventor.177 The AIA formalized the distinction between third-
party prior art and inventor prior art by creating a grace period only
for inventor prior art.178 In other words, inventor-generated activity
170. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
171. See infra Part III.A.3.
172. See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
173. See infra Part III.A.
174. See infra Part III.A.1.
175. See infra Part III.A.2.
176. See infra Part III.B.
177. See infra notes 311-18 and accompanying text; see also Holbrook, supra note 33, at 155
(exploring this dynamic).
178. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012).
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does not qualify as prior art if it arises within the year before the
inventor files her application.179
The third category of prior art covers what some have deemed as
forms of “secret” prior art: information that is not necessarily avail-
able to the public at the relevant date.180 I place in this category
earlier filed patent applications181 and acts of derivation,182 which
occur when the applicant obtained the invention from someone else.
Because these acts are not necessarily public, they pose a challenge
for a purely possession-based system of prior art.183 I consider these
three categories, and the various forms of prior art that fall within
them, below.
A. Prior Art Generated by Someone Other than the Patent
Applicant
Both the 1952 Patent Act and the AIA define as prior art
activities by third parties that publicly disclose the invention,
precluding an applicant from obtaining a patent.184 Prior art takes
two general forms—physical instantiations of the invention and
written descriptions of the invention in a publication of some sort.
This Section discusses each of those sets of prior art using the lens
of possession.
1. Physical Creations of the Invention Must Be Publicly
Accessible
Under both the 1952 Patent Act and the AIA, physical creations
of the invention can qualify for prior art if two conditions are met.185
The first requirement relates to timing: the creation must take place
before the relevant date as defined by the statute. For the 1952
Patent Act, depending on the provision at issue, the relevant date
179. See id.
180. See infra note 408 and accompanying text.
181. See infra Part III.C.2.
182. See infra Part III.C.1.
183. Recall the public notice aspect of possession. See, e.g., supra notes 126-29 and accom-
panying text.
184. See § 102(b)(1); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
185. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2006).
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would be either the applicant’s invention date186 or the date one year
prior to the applicant’s filing date, known as the critical date.187
Second, for these acts to qualify as prior art, there must be some
sort of public accessibility to the creation as well.188 This Part de-
scribes these various prior art provisions and explores them from a
possession-based perspective.
a. A Prior Invention Under the 1952 Patent Act
The epitome of the “first-to-invent” system under the 1952 Patent
Act is found in 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2).189 This provision’s relationship
to possession at a general level is straightforward: if someone else
possessed the invention before the patent applicant, then no patent
should be allowed.190 To show that someone was a prior inventor,
the earlier actor has to demonstrate two things: that she had the
complete idea of the invention, and that she memorialized that idea
physically or in writing.191 The former requirement, the complete
idea of the invention, is known in patent parlance as conception.192
Conception is the complete mental idea of the invention, and thus
conception exists entirely in the mind of the inventor.193 The second
aspect of invention—memorializing the invention in some way—is
186. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
187. Id. § 102(b).
188. Id. § 102(a)-(b).
189. Id. § 102(g)(2). Section 102(g)(1) of the 1952 Patent Act is similar to § 102(g)(2), but
it is limited to interferences, proceedings used to determine who, among competing inventors,
should receive the patent. Id. § 102(g)(1). This provision is not truly a prior art provision
because it deals only with awarding priority and not assessing novelty or nonobviousness. The
primary purpose of this provision was to afford applicants the opportunity to rely upon their
foreign inventive acts in proving the invention date. See infra note 412. Before Congress
amended this provision to create the two distinct provisions of § 102(g)(1) and § 102(g)(2), only
inventive acts within the United States could be used to prove priority. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
(1952).
190. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2006).
191. See id.
192. See Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“It is settled that in estab-
lishing conception a party must show possession of every feature recited in the count, and that
every limitation of the count must have been known to the inventor at the time of the alleged
conception.”). 
193. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“Conception is the ‘formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea
of the complete and operative invention.’” (quoting 1 ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890))). 
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known as reduction to practice.194 The creator can build a functional
version of the invention, known as an actual reduction to practice.195
Alternatively, an inventor can file a patent application, even if she
has not built a working version of the invention, so long as the
application sufficiently discloses how to make and use the claimed
invention, known as a constructive reduction to practice.196
Under the 1952 Patent Act, the first to invent is the person who
(1) is the first to conceive of the invention and (2) is either the first
to reduce the invention to practice or, if not the first, is diligent in
doing so.197 The most important aspect of the inventive act, there-
fore, is that of conception.198 The first to conceive but second to
reduce to practice can win the patent race and thus be deemed the
first to invent.199 Indeed, “[c]onception defines the legally operative
moment of invention under § 102(g).”200
The acts of conception and reduction to practice cannot be made
in secret, however. If someone wants to be deemed the first to
invent, she cannot abandon, suppress, or conceal the invention.201 If
the inventor keeps the invention hidden from the world, she is no
longer deemed the first to invent; a subsequent inventor would then
be entitled to the patent.202
This disqualification epitomizes possession theory. Creating the
invention—the “thing” under the first requirement for posses-
sion—is insufficient without an act that communicates the invention
to the public in some manner.203 Concealing or abandoning the
194. See id.
195. Id. (“Actual reduction to practice requires that the claimed invention work for its
intended purpose.”).
196. Id. (“[C]onstructive reduction to practice occurs when a patent application on the
claimed invention is filed.”).
197. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006); see also Brown v. Barbacid, 436 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“The party that is first to conceive the invention in interference, if last to reduce the
invention to practice, is entitled to the patent based on prior conception if, as first to conceive,
he exercised reasonable diligence from a time before the other party’s conception date to his
own reduction to practice date.”).
198. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (“The primary meaning of the
word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather
than to a physical embodiment of that idea.”).
199. See Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
200. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
201. § 102(g)(2).
202. See id.
203. See supra notes 125-29, 147-48 and accompanying text.
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invention results in the loss of the status of first to invent because,
in one sense, the inventor did not satisfy the conditions of posses-
sion.204 The first-to-invent aspects of § 102(g) map quite precisely
onto the requirements of possession as a descriptive matter.205
b. Public Use and Possession
A physical creation of an invention by a third party can also
qualify as prior art outside of the section 102(g) context.206 The 1952
Patent Act precluded a patent if the invention was known or used
by someone other than the applicant before the applicant’s invention
date or was used publicly more than a year before the applicant’s
filing date.207 Under the AIA, third-party public uses of the inven-
tion are prior art if they arise before the filing date.208
For these forms of prior art, there is a tangible item that is the
basis of the act of possession, a physical instantiation of the inven-
tion by the third party. These forms of prior art also reflect posses-
sion’s requirement of communication to third parties,209 although
with some complications. At the extremes, patent law has been
consistent with possession in this regard: truly public uses of the
invention qualify as prior art, while secret uses of the invention do
not.210 To be in public use, the invention must be accessible to the
public,211 which maps well onto possession theory.212 For example,
204. See § 102(g).
205. See id.
206. See id. § 102(a)-(b).
207. Id.; cf. Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 19 (1939) (finding public use
bar applying to independent third party activity). An invention can be on-sale under sec-
tion 102(b) of the 1952 Patent Act and section 102(a) of the AIA even if the invention has not
been physically reduced to practice. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). I
take up disclosures of the invention via description and written materials in the next subsec-
tion.
208. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). The Federal Circuit has applied the Pfaff test to this provi-
sion, which means that an invention can be on-sale absent a physical embodiment, so long as
there is a sufficient description of the invention to permit a skilled artisan to make the inven-
tion. See generally Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (applying Pfaff standard to the AIA), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2678 (2018). Unlike
the 1952 Patent Act, the AIA provides a one-year grace period only for public uses and sales
activity that originate with the inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012). 
209. See supra notes 125-29, 147-48 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 211-17.
211. An invention is in public use if it was accessible to the public or commercially
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letting guests at a party use the invention is a classic public use.213
The rule is fairly harsh. A single public use of the invention, even if
to only one other person, can trigger the bar.214
Secret uses of an invention by a third party do not qualify as prior
art.215 To qualify as a secret, generally the third party had to act
affirmatively to keep the invention secret, such as by using confi-
dentiality agreements or taking other steps to withhold the inven-
tion from the public.216 Excluding secret uses from the prior art is
consistent with possession theory; the user is seeking to avoid
communicating information about the invention to the public. When
a party takes affirmative steps to withhold something from the
public, it cannot be said to satisfy the communication aspect of
exploited. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
212. See supra notes 125-29, 146-51 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Beachcombers Int’l, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154,
1160 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (allowing party guests to use patented kaleidoscope is invalidating
public use). 
214. Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 20 (1939) (noting “a single use for
profit, not purposely hidden” can qualify as an invalidating public use); Egbert v. Lippmann,
104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881) (“The use of a great number may tend to strengthen the proof, but
one well-defined case of such use is just as effectual to annul the patent as many.”).
215. See Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharm., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[S]ecret
or confidential third-party uses do not invalidate later-filed patents.”); W.L. Gore & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“There is no reason or statutory
basis, however, on which Budd’s and Cropper’s secret commercialization of a process, if
established, could be held a bar to the grant of a patent to Gore on that process.... As between
a prior inventor who benefits from a process by selling its product but suppresses, conceals,
or otherwise keeps the process from the public, and a later inventor who promptly files a pat-
ent application from which the public will gain a disclosure of the process, the law favors the
latter.”); Del Mar Eng’g Labs. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1178, 1182 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Nat’l
Graphics, Inc. v. Brax Ltd., 151 F. Supp. 3d 903, 908 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (“Travel Tags’ confiden-
tial prior use was not an invalidating public use under § 102(b).”), on reconsideration in part,
No. 12-C-1119, 2016 WL 843304 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 1, 2016).
216. Dey, 715 F.3d at 1355 (“For that reason, we have applied section 102(b) to invalidate
a patent based on third-party use when the third party ‘made no attempt to maintain
confidentiality or to deliberately evade disclosure,’ made no ‘discernible effort to maintain the
[invention] as confidential,’ or ‘made no efforts to conceal the device or keep anything about
it secret.’” (internal citations omitted)); W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1549; cf. Egbert v. Lippmann,
104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881) (noting use may be public if made “without limitation or restriction,
or injunction of secrecy”); Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“Wei made no attempt to maintain confidentiality or to deliberately evade disclosure.
Wei’s activities may erect a third party public use bar.”).
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possession theory.217 The public is not in possession of the claimed
invention if the invention is not communicated.
Tougher legal and possession issues arise in other factual con-
texts, however. The publicness of these uses is not truly binary.
Instead, many uses of the invention by third parties lie somewhere
on a continuum of public accessibility that fall between the extremes
of clearly public and clearly secret uses.218 These scenarios arise
when there is a use by a third party, but the invention itself is oc-
cluded in some way from the public.219 The use is not secret in the
sense of being kept confidential, but the use itself does not reveal
the invention to the public.220 For example, imagine a patented lens
for a photocopier.221 Someone using the machine likely would not
realize the invention is contained therein, but nevertheless they
would be using the invention.222 The courts generally have provided
a capacious definition of what constitutes public use.223
Should such noninforming uses be considered prior art from a
possession viewpoint? Historically, such uses have qualified as
public uses. The Supreme Court held expressly that such uses
217. Dey, 715 F.3d at 1359 (“And here, a reasonable jury could conclude that if members
of the public are not informed of, and cannot readily discern, the claimed features of the
invention in the allegedly invalidating prior art, the public has not been put in possession of
those features.” (emphasis added)).
218. See Charles F. Pigott, Jr., The Concepts of Public Sale and Use, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
399, 400 (1967) (“In many instances where a machine is used publicly, the patented invention
relates to an internal component which is hidden inside the machine and cannot be seen by
the public. Nevertheless, if the machine itself is in public use, then all parts thereof whether
or not hidden from view are also deemed to be in public use.”).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,436,145 (“Focusing Lens Pair Combined with Photocopying
Objective”).
222. See Holbrook, supra note 5, at 1011.
223. The D.C. Circuit, prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, described the scope of
the public use bar in this fashion: 
The statutory term “public use” has been given an extraordinarily broad
meaning.... Thus, the fact that there is but one user, or the invention is given
without profit, or that it is hidden from the general public’s eye, would seem to
be immaterial. Nor need the user even realize he is using the invention. It is
immaterial that the use was without the inventor’s consent, or that the use was
due to factors not his fault and beyond his control. It may be fair to conclude that
public use exists where the invention is used by, or exposed to, anyone other
than the inventor or persons under an obligation of secrecy to the inventor.
Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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qualify as prior art in Egbert v. Lippman.224 The invention in Egbert
was a novel corset spring.225 As the invention was worn in undergar-
ments, it generally was not visible to the public.226 Nevertheless, the
Court viewed this use to be public,227 invalidating the patent in the
case.228
Egbert and its progeny229 are inconsistent with the communica-
tion requirement of possession. As noted by the dissent in Egbert,
the use of the invention was clearly not known to the general public:
“If the little steel spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used
by only one woman, covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position
always withheld from public observation, is a public use of that
piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the line between a private and
a public use.”230 Through a possession lens, noninforming uses do
not demonstrate sufficient communication of the invention to the
public. From this perspective, Egbert is wrongly decided. For third-
party public uses, possession theory suggests that third party
noninforming uses should not qualify as prior art. Possession theory
requires some affirmative communicative act,231 not merely passive
activity in hopes that someone notices. For third-party noninforming
uses, the general public is not aware of the invention.232 Thus, a
truly possession-based conception of public use would shift patent
law to exclude noninforming uses as prior art. The important line to
be drawn would no longer be between secret and noninforming uses,
but instead between informing and noninforming uses, with only
the former constituting prior art.
224. 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881).
225. Id. at 335.
226. Id. at 336.
227. Id. at 337.
228. Id. at 337-38.
229. See Pronova Biopharma Norge AS v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 549 F. App’x 934, 940
(Fed. Cir. 2013); Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
230. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
231. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
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c. On-Sale Activity by Third Parties as Prior Art
In contrast to prior uses (at least with respect to informing uses),
the law surrounding the on-sale forms of prior art weaves a more
complicated tale from a possession perspective. To qualify as prior
art, first, an invention must be the subject of a formal commercial
offer for sale233 and be ready for patenting.234 An invention can be
ready for patenting under two circumstances: when the invention
has been reduced to practice, or when a party has prepared dia-
grams and written descriptions of the invention sufficient to permit
one of skill in the art to make the claimed invention.235 In this
fashion, sales-based prior art is a natural bridge between the in-
kind and written forms of prior art.
The on-sale bar is harsh. Just as a single public use can render a
claimed invention invalid, so can a single offer to sell a single unit
of the invention preclude patentability under the on-sale bar.236
Moreover, a mere offer to sell the invention can trigger the bar; the
sale need not be consummated to preclude a patent.237 Public sales
of an invention, such as at a car dealership, would qualify as invali-
dating sales activity.238
233. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). Subsequent to Pfaff, the Federal
Circuit clarified that a formal commercial offer to sell, as defined by contract law principles,
is required for the on-sale bar to apply. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Int’l Corp., 215
F.3d 1246, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“As a result, we conclude that the meaning of ‘offer to sell’
is to be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning in contract law, as revealed by tradi-
tional sources of authority.”). For criticisms of the requirement for a formal commercial offer
for sale based on contract law principles, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat
of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications
for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
751, 783-84 (2003); Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 72, 124-25 (2012); Lucas S. Osborn, The Leaky Common Law: An “Offer to Sell” As a
Policy Tool in Patent Law and Beyond, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 143, 176 (2013).
234. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 791 (C.C.P.A. 1979); see also MUELLER, supra note
13, at 264.
237. Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Only
an offer which rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale, one which the other party could
make into a binding contract by simple acceptance (assuming consideration), constitutes an
offer for sale under [the on-sale bar].”).
238. See, e.g., Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1452 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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The history as to secret sales, though, is a bit more complex than
that of secret uses.239 Indeed, one could argue that, by definition, an
offer to sell necessarily implicates the broader public because the
offer is between two distinct parties.240 As a result, there is a certain
“publicness” to any offer to sell. Nevertheless, courts generally have
viewed purely confidential third-party sales activity as not qualify-
ing as prior art.241 One of the policies underlying the on-sale bar is
the “policy against removing inventions from the public which the
public has justifiably come to believe are freely available to all as a
consequence of prolonged sales activity.”242 Secret sales would not
trigger this public reliance.
The exclusion of confidential sales by third parties maps onto
possession theory quite well. The requirement for communication to
third parties arises because of the in rem nature of property.243 The
communication, therefore, should be to strangers, not merely to a
party with whom one is transacting. As such, possession theory
supports the current law that secret offers to sell the invention by
persons other than the applicant should not qualify as prior art. It
would also suggest that sales need to be nonconfidential, and revela-
tory to a broader public, to constitute prior art.
d. Lessons for Physically-Based Prior Art from Possession
Theory
As the previous discussion demonstrates, possession provides
important descriptive and prescriptive insights into third-party
239. See generally MDS Assocs. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 611, 632-33 (1997) (exploring
history of the on-sale bar and secret third-party sales), aff ’d, 135 F.3d 778 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
240. Cf. Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881) (“We remark, secondly, that, whether
the use of an invention is public or private does not necessarily depend upon the number of
persons to whom its use is known. If an inventor, having made his device, gives or sells it to
another, to be used by the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or injunction of
secrecy, and it is so used, such use is public, even though the use and knowledge of the use
may be confined to one person.”).
241. See, e.g., MDS Assocs., 37 Fed. Cl. at 633.
242. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987), overruled by Pfaff
v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); see also Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65 (“The patent laws
therefore seek both to protect the public’s right to retain knowledge already in the public
domain and the inventor’s right to control whether and when he may patent his invention.”
(emphasis added)). 
243. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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prior art created by physical instantiations of the invention.
Possession suggests that uses must be public, so that “non-inform-
ing” uses would not qualify as prior art.244 Similarly, secret sales
activity would also not qualify as prior art.245
An additional dynamic that possession theory implicates is the
experimental use negation of prior art. Generally, if the physical
embodiment has been created for experimental purposes, it will not
count as prior art, at least with respect to activity by the patent
applicant.246 It is not clear whether the doctrine applies to the use
or sales of the claimed invention by independent inventors, i.e.,
third-parties unrelated to the inventor.
The policy underlying the experimental use negation of public use
as it relates to the inventor is clear: inventors should be given the
chance to perfect their invention in order to file a proper patent
application.247 Otherwise, inventors would be forced to file prema-
ture applications to avoid the bar. As the Supreme Court noted,
“[t]he use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any other
person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to
bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as such
a use.”248 The emphasis on a third party being under the direction
of the inventor begs the question of whether independent third-
party experimentation can negate the public use bar. 
These policy concerns are not present in the third party context:
the third party generally has not filed a patent application, so the
concern is no longer present. Thus the question remains whether
experimentation by a third party can negate the public use and on
bars as to that third party’s activities.249 Some courts have con-
cluded that the experimental use negation is inapplicable to third
party activities.250 Others, however, have applied the negation to
244. See supra Part III.A.1.b.
245. See supra Part III.A.1.c.
246. See Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877); Electromotive Div. of Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (dis-
cussing experimental use in the on-sale bar context); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113,
1121 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing experimental use in the public use context). 
247. See infra notes 365-66.
248. Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 134 (emphasis added).
249. See Pigott, supra note 218, at 419 (arguing for a distinction between inventor and
third party experimental use).
250. See Magnetics, Inc. v. Arnold Eng’g Co., 438 F.2d 72, 74 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
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third party activities.251 The earlier doctrine of “failed experimenta-
tion,” where the earlier independent inventor’s efforts failed, would
seem to support applying the experimental use doctrine to third
party activities because courts did not deem failed experimentation
as invalidating.252 The Federal Circuit has yet to confront this ques-
tion squarely, leaving it open. There is dicta in two Federal Circuit
opinions, however, that suggests the court will reject independent
third party experimentation as a negation of the statutory bars.253
Mistop, Inc. v. Aerofin Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 224, 230 (D. Conn. 2003) (“The inventor’s lack
of control or direction over the use is given great weight in the analysis; there can be no
experimental use when the testing is not done for the benefit of the inventor.”); Dow Chem.
Co. v. Mee Indus., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1038 n.29 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“The experimental nega-
tion of the on-sale bar, however, applies only to the inventor or someone under the inventor’s
direction.”), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Dow Chem. Co. v. Mee Indus.,
Inc., 341 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Code Alarm, Inc. v. Directed Elecs., Inc., 919 F. Supp.
259, 263-64 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (experimental use limited to inventor or inventor-controlled
experimentation); Moxness Prods. Inc. v. Xomed Inc., No. 86-100-CIV-J-14, 1988 WL 281579,
at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 1988) (“Only the inventor, and not ‘another’ person, would be
warranted in asserting the experimental use exception.”), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 891 F.2d
890 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona Inc., 570 F. Supp. 1097, 1108 (D. Del. 1983)
(“The law is clear that the experimental use exception to the public use and on sale bar of
§ 102(b) applies to experiments of the inventor or persons under his control, not to third
parties.”), aff ’d, 740 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
251. See Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1362 (11th Cir. 1982)
(assuming third party experimental use could negate public use bar); Watson v. Allen, 254
F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See generally CHISUM, supra note 78, § 6.02 (characterizing
Watson as holding “that the experimental nature of use by a third-party precluded application
of the statutory bar without considering the difference between use by the inventor and use
by a third-party”).
252. See, e.g., Parkhurst v. Kinsman, 18 F. Cas. 1198, 1201 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (“Crude
and imperfect experiments, equivocal in their results, and then given up for years, cannot be
permitted to prevail against an original inventor, who has perfected his improvement and
obtained his patent.”), aff’d, 59 U.S. 289 (1855). See generally Mark D. Janis, Mr. Nicolson’s
Cane, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 674-75 (2017) (discussing cases in which abandoned experimen-
tation did not invalidate a later patent and their implications for the experimental use
negation).
253. See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1060-61 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“[P]ublic testing before the critical date by a third party for his own unique purposes of an
invention previously reduced to practice and obtained from someone other than the patentee,
when such testing is independent of and not controlled by the patentee, is an invalidating
public use, not an experimental use.”); In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(citing Magnetics favorably and noting that “[t]he experimental use doctrine operates in the
inventor’s favor to allow the inventor to refine his invention or to assess its value relative to
the time and expense of prosecuting a patent application. If it is not the inventor or someone
under his control or ‘surveillance’ who does these things, there appears to us no reason why
he should be entitled to rely upon them to avoid the statute.”). 
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One could argue that experimentation by independent inventors
should not negate invalidating public uses or offers to sell. The
policy interest in ensuring that an inventor has reduced the
invention to practice prior to filing a patent application254 does not
apply to third parties, who have not applied for a patent. Thus any
use or sale could be viewed as prior art, regardless of whether the
purpose was to experiment. So long as the acts were publicly
accessible, the information about the invention—experimental or
not—has entered the public domain.
Possession theory, however, suggests that such experimentation
should not qualify as invalidating prior art. It cannot be said that
the public is in possession of the invention, regardless of how public
the activity, if it is unknown whether the invention actually works
at that time.255 This is true even for third-party activity. Thus, even
though the policies underlying the experimental use negation differ
for third party activity, this analysis suggests that they, too, should
negate a potentially invalidating offer to sale or public use. In
essence, the “thing” is missing from the possession analysis because
the public would not know whether the invention actually works.
2. “Paper” Disclosures of the Invention by Third Parties: Earlier
Patents, Printed Publications, and Other Written Disclosures
Patents and printed publications by third parties represent the
least controversial form of prior art. For printed publications, a
third party has disclosed the invention to the broader public in a
manner that must be publicly accessible.256 The term has evolved to
254. See supra text accompanying note 253.
255. Cf. Many v. Jagger, 16 F. Cas. 677, 682 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1848) (noting that conceiving
of a new invention “alone is of no benefit to mankind, and is not worthy of the patronage of
government. The new idea must be reduced to some practical use before it can become the
subject of a patent, or be set up and relied on to defeat a patent.”).
256. Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Whether
a given reference is a ‘printed publication’ depends on whether it was ‘publicly accessible’
during the prior period.”); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he key
inquiry is whether or not a reference has been made ‘publicly accessible.’”); In re Cronyn, 890
F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that a printed publication must be “sufficiently
accessible to the public interested in the art”). 
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include new forms of media, such as online publications257 and
videos.258
Similarly, patenting the invention by someone else discloses the
invention to the public.259 One of the key inquiries as to whether
foreign forms of intellectual property qualify as “patented” under
the 1952 Patent Act and the AIA is whether the intellectual prop-
erty discloses the invention to the public.260 The requirement for
public accessibility for these forms of prior art demonstrate the act
of communication to others, as required by possession theory.
One could question whether the present law is too lenient in
terms of the public accessibility requirement. The law is not terribly
strict: the Federal Circuit has found a single indexed thesis in a
German library to be sufficiently publicly accessible to qualify as a
printed publication.261 In contrast, the court held that three student
theses were not printed publications because they were not indexed
at the relevant library.262 According to the Federal Circuit, “the
three student theses were not accessible to the public because they
had not been either cataloged or indexed in a meaningful way.”263
The PHOSITA is assumed, therefore, to be able to search every
library in the world, in every language, to find the reference so long
as it is indexed. The PHOSITA in this way seems more impressive
than a Google search!
This capacious approach to the public accessibility requirement
comports with possession theory. Possession in the property context
has never required actual communication; rather, it is the potential
that an interested party could receive the communication from the
257. See, e.g., Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software, Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
258. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
259. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (noting the disclosure requirements for
patent application). See generally Sean B. Seymore, The “Printed Publication” Bar After
Klopfenstein: Has the Federal Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About Sci-
ence?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 493, 501 (2007).
260. In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992), as revised on reh’g (Feb. 1, 1993)
(noting requirement “that the patent be ‘available to the public’”); In re Ekenstam, 256 F.2d
321, 325 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (“[T]he word ‘patented’ as used in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) is
limited to patents which are available to the public.”).
261. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
262. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
263. Id. 
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claimant that she is asserting dominion over the item.264 So, while
communication and public accessibility are key, patent law does not
impose a particularly robust communication requirement, consistent
with property law.265
3. Otherwise Available to the Public
The AIA has created a new, fifth category of prior art. If the
invention was “otherwise available to the public,” beyond patents,
printed publications, public uses, or sales activity, then the inventor
will be unable to obtain a patent.266 It remains unclear what types
of prior art will qualify under this catch-all provision.267 One type of
disclosure that likely falls into this category—in contrast to the
1952 Patent Act—is oral disclosure of the invention.268 Such
disclosures are prior art in other countries.269 Verbal disclosures
create issues of proof: unless they have been recorded or there is
some other form of corroboration, there could be uncertainty as to
the content of any such disclosure. Nevertheless, the new category
would seem to contemplate oral disclosures.270
This provision presents the issue of how available to the public
must the disclosure be in order to qualify as prior art. The ideas of
public accessibility under the 1952 Patent Act should inform this
analysis.271 Something far less than widespread public awareness of
264. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
265. Cf. GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC, No. 2017-1894, 2018 WL 3596007, at *3-5
(Fed. Cir. July 27, 2018) (holding catalog at trade show to be printed publication even if
relevant audience may not have been there); Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 895
F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (meeting materials posted online deemed printed publication).
266. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
267. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 64, § 2152.02(e) (listing a variety
of situations that may fall under this provision).
268. See id. § 2128.01 (“An oral presentation at a scientific meeting or a demonstration at
a trade show may be prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102 (a)(1)’s provision: ‘otherwise available to
the public.’”); id. § 2152.02(e) (“Even if a document or other disclosure is not a printed publica-
tion, or a transaction is not a sale, either may be prior art under the ‘otherwise available to
the public’ provision.”).
269. Amy Nelson, Obviousness or Inventive Step as Applied to Nucleic Acid Molecules: A
Global Perspective, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15-16 (2004).
270. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
271. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 64, § 2152.02(e) (“This ‘catch all’
provision permits decision makers to focus on whether the disclosure was ‘available to the
public,’ rather than on the means by which the claimed invention became available to the
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the oral statement should suffice.272 From a possession perspective,
the disclosure could be to a relatively localized audience, so long as
it is not secret.273 Possession in the property context does not require
widespread communication beyond the item at issue; it need only be
accessible to the relevant public in the area.274 Similarly, the public
communication aspect of this new provision seemingly would not
require widespread publication.275 Instead, accessibility to the inter-
ested public—akin to current printed publications—would seem
appropriate.
B. Inventor-Specific Prior Art—Possession or Statute of
Limitations?
In patent law, the inventor’s own acts can destroy her ability to
obtain a patent. This is the case under the statutory bars of the
1952 Patent Act276 and for all prior art (subject to the one year grace
period) under the AIA.277 If the inventor is in possession of the
invention and is, in some sense, withholding the invention from the
public by delaying the filing of her application, should that informa-
tion nevertheless be used against her? This is not a new refrain. It
strikes to the core of many of the prior art doctrines, particularly
public uses of which the public is not aware278 and secret offers to
sell the invention.279 Possession theory can offer new insights into
these ongoing, vexing issues.
public.”).
272. See id.
273. See id. (citing, as an example, “a poster display ... disseminated at a scientific meet-
ing”).
274. See infra Part III.B.1.
275. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
276. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(d), (g) (2006).
277. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012).
278. See supra Part III.A.1.b.
279. See supra Part III.A.1.c.
2018] PATENT PRIOR ART AND POSSESSION 165
1. How Possession Creates Consequences for Owners in Property
Law
In property law, there are areas where actors attempting to
possess items may forfeit the property or never take possession due
to their own behavior. In these contexts, the purported owner has
information unavailable to third parties, yet the owner either loses
the ownership interest or never becomes the owner. As to the
former, we allow owners to abandon personal property. When some-
one relinquishes all interest in the property, it becomes “unowned”
and becomes the property of the first person to take possession of
it.280 Of course, that second-comer may have no idea that the
original owner has abandoned it. One of the complexities of the
various doctrines of lost and found property is that they depend on
the mental state of the owner, who by definition is not present.281
Thus, property law does create consequences for property owners
acting with knowledge known only to them.282
Similarly, property law precludes ownership for adverse possess-
ors if they fail to satisfy all the requisite conditions. The adverse
possessor must exclusively use the property in a manner similar to
the surrounding property.283 Moreover, the use must be open and
notorious, which necessitates some level of communication and
notice to others, particularly the owner of the property.284 Failure to
satisfy these conditions means that the occupier cannot obtain the
property through adverse possession even if the statute of limita-
tions has run.285 In this context, the failure to communicate the
adverse possessor’s occupation adequately to the true owner results
in the adverse possessor failing to obtain ownership of the
property.286 This differs, of course, from the acts of an inventor
280. See Ritz v. Selma United Methodist Church, 467 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Iowa 1991) (“Aban-
doned property is that to which the owner has voluntarily relinquished all right, title, and
interest with the intention of terminating his ownership. The finder who reduces abandoned
property to possession acquires absolute title as against the former owner.” (citation omitted)).
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See, e.g., Ray v. Beacon Hudson Mountain Corp., 666 N.E.2d 532, 536 (N.Y. 1996)
(noting that improvements to land constituted exclusive use and occupation). 
284. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 148-49 (8th ed. 2014).
285. Id. at 148.
286. See id. at 148-49.
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precluding a patent.287 But they are similar—both require the oc-
cupier to perform certain acts completely within her control.288 A
failure to make these acts sufficiently public, for example, results in
no adverse possession.289 It is unsurprising, therefore, that we treat
an inventor differently—and potentially more harshly—if they fail
to bring the invention to the public in a certain period of time when
compared with third party activities.290
2. Inventor-Generated Prior Art—Public Knowledge or
Statute of Limitations Punishment?
In the property context, typically a party’s act of possession com-
municates to third parties that the item is someone’s property.291
Generally, the possessor’s activity is not used against her.292 Patent
law is different, however, in that the inventor’s own acts can qualify
as prior art to demonstrate that the public was in possession of the
invention.293 Drawing on earlier cases, the inventor is said to have
abandoned the invention to the public in some sense.294 Thus,
instead of demonstrating possession against the world, the inven-
tor’s acts instead communicate to the public that the invention is
free to be used.295
It makes sense that the inventor can forfeit her right to a patent
on the invention through her own acts. She is in the best position to
control the filing of a patent application: she knows when the in-
vention is ready for patenting, can control her public uses and
commercialization activities, and can determine when to file the
application.
The question to be explored is how possession—and the need for
communication—fits into this context, if at all. The concern with
inventor-based prior art, therefore, is less about the nature of the
287. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
288. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 284, at 148-49.
289. See id.
290. See infra Part III.B.4.
291. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
292. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 284, at 148-49.
293. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b) (2012).
294. See, e.g., Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1881).
295. See id.
2018] PATENT PRIOR ART AND POSSESSION 167
act—a tangible embodiment of the invention or a written disclo-
sure—but instead whether we should treat applicants differently
than third parties because the applicants are in possession and
control of the information regarding the invention. Because they are
in control of the disclosure of such information and the timing of any
patent applications, inventors are in a position to arbitrage the
patent system.
Under section 102(b) of the 1952 Patent Act, the inventor’s own
patents, printed publications, public uses, and on-sale bar activity
could be used against her if they occurred prior to the critical
date.296 These statutory bars under the 1952 Patent Act and earlier
patent acts effected a check on potential abuses in a true first-to-
invent system. If the first person to invent always received the
patent, then the inventor could commercialize or use the invention
for years while still being entitled to file a patent application be-
cause she was the first to invent. The statutory bars capped this
potential abuse by giving the inventor a fixed period—one year
under the 1952 Patent Act—to take such actions before filing an
application.297 These statutory grace periods, however, applied to
both inventor and third-party activity under the 1952 Patent Act.298
In contrast, the AIA affords a one-year grace period only for acts
by the inventor.299 Third-party activities now serve as prior art so
long as they are sufficiently publicly available prior to the applica-
tion’s filing date; there is no grace period.300 The AIA, therefore, has
embraced the third-party/inventor distinction formally and structur-
ally.301 The following Section discusses the various forms of inven-
tor-generated prior art and how possession theory informs the
doctrines underlying such prior art.
296. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
297. Id.
298. See id.
299. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012).
300. See id. § 102(b).
301. See id. § 102(a)-(b)(1).
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3. Patents and Printed Publications
Both the 1952 Patent Act302 and the AIA303 define patents and
printed publications as forms of prior art. From a possession
viewpoint, these provisions are both uncontroversial. These forms
of prior art satisfy the “public communication” aspect of possession
theory.304 To qualify as prior art, these forms must generally be
publicly available.305 Patents, of course, generally are published
when issued.306 Printed publications by the inventor must generally
be publicly accessible, just as third-party publications must be.307
Moreover, because this information generally comes from the
inventor,308 the information-forcing aspect of these provisions comes
into play. We do not want inventors to disclose the invention and
then delay filing patent applications. Instead, the patent system is
designed to encourage prompt disclosures of inventions through the
patent application process. Such bars also serve to protect the
public. If the inventor has disclosed the invention in a printed
publication or in a different patent, then the public may come to
view that information as freely available.309 The inventor should not
be able to effectively snatch this information back out of the hands
of the public after the grace period ends.310
In many regards, these forms of applicant-generated prior art do
not feel terribly different than third-party art. Perhaps, in close
cases of whether the disclosure was public, one could draw the line
for an inventor’s own printed publications against the inventor
more capaciously than third-party disclosures: if in doubt, consider
the inventor’s disclosure to be an invalidating public disclosure. The
inventor is in a position to control the disclosure of the invention to
the public as well as the filing of the patent application. Such
control creates an incentive for the inventor to keep the invention
302. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b), (d)-(e) (2006).
303. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
304. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
305. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b).
306. See id. § 153.
307. See id. § 102(a); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
308. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (noting that applicants must disclose
inventions).
309. See supra Part III.B.2.
310. See supra Part III.B.2.
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from the public’s view, permitting her to game the system: by keep-
ing the disclosure out of the public domain, she delays the start of
her one year grace period, allowing her to delay her filing if needed.
Generally, however, these provisions are fairly uncontroversial.
4. Uses and Sales Activity
Public use doctrine under the 1952 Patent Act has created a
bifurcated approach to public uses by third parties and the in-
ventor.311 As discussed above, secret uses of an invention by third
parties do not qualify as prior art.312 The law is a bit messier for se-
cret uses by the inventor.313
The courts have held that some secret uses by inventors do not
qualify as prior art.314 But the courts have concluded that other se-
cret uses by an inventor do qualify as invalidating public uses, even
when such a use by a third party would not. In Metallizing Engi-
neering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., the patent owner
had secretly used the patented process to produce a product that it
sold.315 Although the use of the process was secret, Judge Learned
Hand nevertheless concluded that, due to the commercialization of
the product of the process, the use of the process qualified as an
invalidating public use.316 The same activity by a third party,
however, would not qualify as prior art.317 The Federal Circuit has
adopted this rule.318 Thus, the same language in the statute has
come to mean different things, depending on whether an applicant
or a third party engaged in the same activity.
The Metallizing rule has not been without controversy.319 In that
context, the invention itself—generally a method—remains un-
311. See supra Part III.A.1.b.
312. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
315. 153 F.2d 516, 517-18 (2d Cir. 1946).
316. Id. at 520.
317. Merges, supra note 16, at 1034-35 (“The cases on non-informing public use and sale
have distinguished between the inventor’s own activity and the activities of third parties. An
inventor’s own non-informing use is prior art, whereas a third party’s is not.”).
318. See, e.g., Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
319. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Did Learned Hand Get It Wrong?: The Questionable Patent
Forfeiture Rule of Metallizing Engineering, 57 VILL. L. REV. 261, 268-69 (2012).
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known to the public at large.320 There is no communication of the
details of the invention; the only public act is the selling of the
product.321 But the product does not communicate the invention
itself to the public.322 Thus, this variation of secret uses is also
inconsistent with possession theory.323
One of the largest debates in patent law today is whether Metal-
lizing survived Congress’s passage of the AIA.324 The first four forms
of prior art defined in section 102(a) of the AIA are verbatim to
those found in section 102(b) of 1952 Patent Act: a patent is pre-
cluded if the claimed invention was “patented, described in a print-
ed publication, ... in public use, [or] on sale.”325 Given the identical
language in the AIA, one would logically believe that Congress
simply imported the case law interpreting those terms into the AIA
without modification.326 
There is one important difference between section 102(a)(1) of the
AIA and section 102(b) of the 1952 Patent Act: the addition of a fifth
form of prior art, “otherwise available to the public.”327 This lan-
guage is the hook upon which those arguing that the AIA changed
the law have hung their hats.328 Adding weight to their argumenta-
tion is that two key proponents of this view were involved in draft-
ing and passing the AIA.329 The USPTO itself issued examination
320. See Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 517-18.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. Compare id., with supra note 147 and accompanying text.
324. See sources cited supra note 16.
325. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (precluding patent if the inven-
tion “was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country”). The AIA removed the geographic limitations mentioned
in Section 102(b) of the 1952 Patent Act. See § 102(a)(1) (2012); see also Armitage, supra note
16, at 49 (“Under the AIA, thus, the new § 102(a)(1) can be viewed as having pre-AIA § 102(b)
as its statutory origin.”); Lemley, supra note 15, at 1125.
326. This is a settled principle of statutory interpretation. See Sekhar v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2720, 2724 (2013); Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011); Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999).
327. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
328. See Armitage, supra note 16, at 53 (“The terms ‘in public use or on sale’ have been
further modified and qualified by a new phrase that reads in its entirety: ‘in public use, on
sale, or otherwise available to the public.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C.§ 102(a)(1) (2012))); Joe Matal,
A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J.
435, 471-72 (2012).
329. Lemley, supra note 15, at 1120 (“Because two of these commentators, Bob Armitage
and Joe Matal, were involved in the drafting of the AIA, this argument has carried substantial
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guidelines adopting the view that the AIA changed the law as to
secret sales and uses.330 These guidelines do not have the “force and
effect of law,” and the courts are free to disagree with the USPTO’s
views.331
The prior art provisions of the AIA went into force in March
2013.332 The courts, therefore, are only now beginning to interpret
these provisions. The first district court to encounter the issue of
secret sales sided with these commentators’ and the USPTO’s view.
In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., the dis-
trict court
conclude[d] that § 102(a)(1) requires a public sale or offer for sale
of the claimed invention. The new requirement that the on-sale
bar apply to public sales comports with the plain language
meaning of the amended section, the USPTO’s interpretation of
the amendment, the AIA Committee Report, and Congress’s
overarching goal to modernize and streamline the United States
patent system.333
Others, however, have argued that the “otherwise available to the
public” language is a thin textual basis for jettisoning decades of
judicial interpretations of these terms.334
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
reasoning and decided the case on different, narrower grounds.335
Judge O’Malley, however, agreed with those who believe the AIA did
not change the law.336 The issue remains unresolved to date, although
weight.”). 
330. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor to File Provisions of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,062, 11,075 (Feb. 14, 2013) (codi-
fied at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
331. Id. at 11,059.
332. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 293
(2011) (noting that the AIA prior art provisions come into effect eighteen months after
enactment). 
333. No. 11-3962 (MLC), 2016 WL 832089, at *45 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2016), rev’d sub nom.,
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 2678 (2018).
334. Lemley, supra note 15, at 1127-28.
335. Helsinn Healthcare, 855 F.3d at 1368-69, 1375 (“We decline the invitation by the
parties to decide this case more broadly than necessary.”), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2678
(2018).
336. See Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v.
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though the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to hear the
case in its 2018-19 term.337
This Article offers a novel perspective on this debate. A posses-
sion-based approach to inventor-based uses and sales would suggest
the need for general public availability. It would thus support the
reformer’s view of the AIA, primarily because the earlier cases, such
as Egbert, were wrongly decided from a possession perspective.338
Patent law thus went down this path by starting on the wrong foot.
But the answer is not that simple. Because these sales and uses
are by the inventor—not a third party—there are reasons to treat
such information differently. By taking these steps, one could view
the inventor as having abandoned her ability to seek patent pro-
tection simply by trying to game the patent system.339 If we are truly
concerned with incentivizing the inventor to disclose her invention
promptly by filing an application, then the public versus secret line
may be wrong.
Instead, perhaps all inventor activity—even if secret—could be
deemed prior art to best effectuate our interest in the patent
system. In other words, inventors would face a strict statute of
limitations for any commercial use or sales of the invention
regardless of whether those acts were public. One could envision an
absolute rule, stronger than that of Metallizing,340 where even com-
mercialization of the secret process is not required. Any use—secret
or otherwise—would be invalidating. Cases such as Invitrogen Corp.
v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., finding no public use bar because
the applicant’s use of the invention was secret,341 are wrong under
the statute of limitations view. Such uses would serve to invalidate
the patent. In contrast, under this approach the holding of Egbert342
would be correct: noninforming uses would be deemed invalidating.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Nos. 2016-1284, 2016-1787), 2018 WL
1583031, at *1 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
337. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm., 138 S. Ct. 2678, 2678 (2018).
338. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
339. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877) (“It is sometimes said that an
inventor acquires an undue advantage over the public by delaying to take out a patent,
inasmuch as he thereby preserves the monopoly to himself for a longer period than is allowed
by the policy of the law.”).
340. See Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d
Cir. 1946).
341. 424 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
342. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881).
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The inventor was in possession of the claimed invention, yet failed
to promptly file a patent application when she had the power to do
so. Whether it is public would be irrelevant.
Such an approach is analogous to adverse possession, in particu-
lar the “sleeping” views of adverse possession. Under sleeping the-
ory, the property owner effectively forfeits her right to the property
by failing to adequately monitor the property to evict the adverse
possessor.343 Given all of the requirements of adverse possession
designed to provide the true owner with notice of the adverse pos-
sessor’s presence,344 the sleeping theory posits the owner “no longer
deserve[s] to hold title.”345
One can also envision an earning theory346 aspect to this ap-
proach. The party secretly using or commercializing the invention
will be unable to obtain a patent, but third parties who have both
engaged in the necessary inventive activity and who have brought
the invention to the public through a patent application will be re-
warded. These parties could be deemed to have earned the patent,
and the secret activities by the earlier inventor cannot be used
against the earning inventor.347 The patent, therefore, goes to the
more deserving inventor.
343. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 284, at 148-49 (describing earning and sleeping
theories of adverse possession); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession,
89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2434-35 (2001) (discussing sleeping theory of adverse possession).
344. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 284, at 148 (listing notice-based requirements for
adverse possession, such as exclusive possession and a use that is open and notorious).
345. Stake, supra note 343, at 2435.
346. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 284, at 148.
347. A similar dynamic is what led to the passage of the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999.
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-555 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012)). Prior to the
Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), conventional wisdom was that business methods were not
patentable. Many business methods were used as trade secrets as a result. Once the Federal
Circuit green-lighted business method patents in State Street, however, many inventors could
not obtain patent protection under Metallizing because they had secretly used the process for
commercial purposes. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375; Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). Third parties, however, were now
free to patent such business methods, and the earlier secret use would not constitute prior art
against them. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375, 1377; Merges, supra note 16, at 1034-35.
This dynamic meant that the earlier inventor could now be deemed an infringer. The First
Inventor Defense Act created a narrow form of prior user rights that would immunize such
parties from liability. See § 4302(b)(1), 113 Stat. at 1501A-556. The AIA expanded the First
Inventor Defense Act into a broader prior user rights provision. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012).
174 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:123
This analogy is not perfect, of course. Adverse possession results
in a current property owner losing title to her property in favor of a
trespasser.348 In the patent context, there has yet to be an award of
a property right. The secret user or seller of the invention would for-
feit the ability to obtain a future property right. But the reasoning
nevertheless is attractive because the inventor secretly using or
commercializing the invention is the lowest cost avoider. As between
the secret inventor and either the public or a subsequent inventor
who brings the invention to the public, we should favor the latter
two. The secret user could have filed an application within the
statutory grace period but failed to do so. As a result, that inventor
forfeits the ability to get a patent.
Such an absolute novelty approach for inventors’ secret uses and
sales would require some important limitations and policing. For
example, we actually hope that inventors take time to perform
research to ensure that the invention actually works.349 Indeed, it
can take an inventor a considerable amount of time to ascertain
whether her invention will work for its intended purpose. As a
result, the experimental use negation of such uses as prior art
would be quite important.350 From a possession viewpoint, the
inventor cannot be deemed in possession of the invention yet if she
does not know whether it will work.
Additionally, the strict novelty approach could result in third
parties obtaining patent protection over the inventor’s creation,
while the inventor herself would be unable to obtain a patent.351 The
earlier inventor could thus become an infringer. If such a state of
affairs is deemed inequitable, then the patent system would have to
ensure a robust form of prior user rights for the earlier inventor.352
Nevertheless, one could easily envision a regime where secret uses
348. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 284, at 148.
349. See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“This doctrine is
based on the underlying policy of providing an inventor time to determine if the invention is
suitable for its intended purpose, in effect, to reduce the invention to practice.”).
350. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877) (excusing a public use “when the
delay is occasioned by a bona fide effort to bring [the] invention to perfection, or to ascertain
whether it will answer the purpose intended.”); see also Janis, supra note 252, at 649-50
(“[T]he public’s interest [is] in blocking inventors from improperly extending the patent term,
while also allowing inventors time to perfect their inventions.”). 
351. See supra notes 346-47 and accompanying text.
352. See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012); cf. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense
to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006). 
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and commercialization by the inventor could preclude her ability to
get a patent, regardless of whether such activity were public.353
This review of possession-based conceptions of inventor-generated
prior art leads to three possible approaches. One would be to use the
same approach as for third-party prior art, requiring that the prior
art be publicly accessible.354 Under this approach, there would be no
distinction between third-party and inventor generated prior art.
The second approach would be the strict statute of limitations ap-
proach: the inventor is precluded from obtaining the patent if they
engage in commercial or secret uses for too long of a period (gener-
ally one year).355 Secret uses and sales would be invalidating along
with public ones. The third option would be the status quo, which is
a hybrid approach. Noninforming uses, which are not generally
available to the public, would count.356 Moreover, secret uses that
result in public commercialization are considered prior art under
Metallizing,357 whereas other secret uses do not qualify. Under the
1952 Patent Act, courts have carved out distinctions between inven-
tor and third-party prior art in the face of the same statutory lan-
guage.358 Thus, the status quo is inconsistent from the perspective
of statutory interpretation and incoherent in terms of theory.
Therefore, it may be preferable to treat inventor prior art identically
to third-party prior art or to create a strict statute of limitations
approach.359
C. The Odd Categories: Derivation and Earlier Filed Patent
Applications
There are two forms of prior art that do not track possession
theory particularly well. The first category of prior art under the
1952 Patent Act are acts of derivation, where the applicant took the
353. There could be an evidentiary issue of actually discovering such secret uses. 
354. See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
355. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012).
356. See supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
357. See Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts, 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir.
1946).
358. See supra notes 215-16.
359. I evaluate these approaches infra Part IV. I ultimately advocate for the consistent
approach because it makes all prior art on level ground and because the statute does not
support a pure statute of limitations approach. 
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invention from a third party, the true inventor.360 Derivation re-
quires only a communication from the true inventor to the appli-
cant, but such communication may be secret.361 From a possession
perspective, there is an act of communication, but, contrary to
possession theory, the communication is not necessarily accessible
to a broader audience.362 The AIA technically eliminated derivation
as a form of prior art, but it does afford protection against such
appropriation by disqualifying certain forms of prior art that have
their genesis with the true inventor.363 The AIA also creates a new
proceeding, the derivation procedure, that will award the patent to
the true inventor even if she is not the first to file.364
The second type of prior art is patent applications filed before the
relevant date, the date of invention for the 1952 Patent Act and the
filing date for the AIA. These earlier applications qualify as prior
art only if they eventually come to public light by being published
or issued as patents.365 Yet these applications are effective as prior
art as of their filing date.366 These applications therefore are secret
and unknowable as of the effective prior art date. There is not a
contemporaneous communication with the broader public.
This Part explores these forms of prior art and their ill-fit to
possession conceptions given their secrecy aspects.
1. Derivation Provisions—What Happens When Someone
Steals the Idea?
Both the 1952 Patent Act and the AIA protect inventors against
third parties taking their inventions and obtaining patent protection
on them.367 This “theft” of the idea is known as derivation. Under
the 1952 Patent Act, this makes sense: one cannot be said to be the
360. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006).
361. See infra notes 388-90 and accompanying text.
362. See infra notes 391-95 and accompanying text.
363. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A)-(2)(B) (2012) (excluding disclosures made by someone who
“obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint
inventor”).
364. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012).
365. Id. § 102(a)(2); 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1)-(2) (2006).
366. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (d) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1)-(2) (2006).
367. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006).
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first to invent if she obtained the idea from another.368 This pro-
hibition is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).369 The text of that provision
is a bit thin, merely noting that one cannot get a patent if “he did
not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”370 The
courts have made clear that, for derivation to arise, there must be
a communication between the first inventor and the deriver that is
sufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the
claimed invention.371 The requirement of an enabling communica-
tion is consistent with a possession-based view of novelty and
nonobviousness because it shows that the third party was the first
to possess the invention, not the applicant.372 Also essential and con-
sistent with possession theory is the need for communication: there
has been an express, enabling communication to the deriver of the
invention.373
The problem for possession theory, however, is that these com-
munications can be confidential between the two parties. They need
not be publicly accessible in order to invalidate the patent. In this
sense, the necessary communicative act to third parties may not be
present.374 Actually, if the communications were public, they might
qualify as some other form of prior art, such as a printed publica-
tion.375 Because derivative prior art can be confidential, nonpublic
communication, such acts of communication do not fall squarely
within the classic possession paradigm.376
The AIA technically eliminates section 102(f) as a form of prior
art.377 Instead, the AIA excludes as prior art materials that came
directly or indirectly from the inventor so that such disclosures
cannot be used to invalidate the true inventor’s patent or applica-
tion.378 The AIA also provides for derivation proceedings in court
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See, e.g., Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
372. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
374. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401-02 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[Sec-
tion 102(f)] does not pertain only to public knowledge, but also applies to private communi-
cations between the inventor and another which may never become public.”).
375. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
376. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
377. MUELLER, supra note 13, at 289.
378. § 102(b)(1)-(2)(B).
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and at the USPTO that permit the first inventor to get the patent
even if she was not the first to file.379 The derivation exclusions are
why the AIA is viewed as a “first-inventor-to-file” system, not a true
first-to-file one.380 Moreover, Professor Mark Janis and I have ar-
gued that the derivation protection saves the AIA from a constitu-
tional challenge based on awarding the patent to someone who is
not truly an inventor under the Patent Clause.381
The AIA derivation provisions remain ambiguous and under-
explored. The AIA permits a patent holder to bring a suit in district
court if another patentee derived the claimed invention.382 Similarly,
a patent applicant can challenge an earlier filed application on the
basis that the earlier applicant derived the invention in a derivation
proceeding.383 These provisions replaced the comparable provisions
in the 1952 Patent Act that dealt with interferences, proceedings in
which the USPTO determined who was the first to invent and thus
entitled to the patent among competing claimants.384
Interestingly, the AIA never defines the term “derived.” The 1952
Patent Act never used the term expressly, but section 102(f) was
generally known as the derivation provision.385 Absent an express
definition in the AIA, Congress apparently intended to import the
1952 Patent Act’s definition into the AIA.386 Thus, to prove deriva-
tion, a challenger would likely need to prove the complete concep-
tion of the invention and an enabling communication to the accused
deriver.387
379. See id. § 135(a)(1). 
380. See id.
381. See, e.g., Letter from Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis to the Honorable Lamar
Smith, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, at 3-4 (June 13, 2011), https://www.autm.
net/AUTMMain/media/About/Documents/holbrookjanisletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/39CM-
BAVM].
382. 35 U.S.C. § 291(a) (2012).
383. Id. § 135(a)(1).
384. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2006).
385. See, e.g., OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(describing section 102(f) as “a derivation provision, which provides that one may not obtain
a patent on that which is obtained from someone else whose possession of the subject matter
is inherently ‘prior’”).
386. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
387. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012).
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The AIA does afford a broader view of derivation in its prior art
provisions.388 The AIA excludes as prior art any disclosure in section
102(a) where someone “obtained the subject matter disclosed
directly or indirectly” from the true inventor.389 Derivation under
the 1952 Patent Act contemplates direct communication between
the true inventor and the deriver. How, then, does one indirectly
obtain the subject matter? The prior art exclusions seemingly ex-
pand the concept of derivation beyond the 1952 Patent Act’s
definition.390
The question will arise, of course, as to the degree of indirectness,
in a manner akin to proximate cause. Possession theory suggests
that derivation by indirect communication should be narrowly
construed. The communication in the property context is generally
quite direct, arising from particular acts of the party asserting
dominion over a thing.391 To provide notice to third parties, the
communication would generally be directed to the potential third
parties curious as to who is asserting an interest over the resource
at issue.392 It would be odd to think that such notice-providing
communication could arise when one party communicated the re-
source to someone else via some “telephone” game chain of events.393
Possession generally requires fairly direct communication from the
possessor to third parties.394 Here, indirect communication could
present difficult issues, such as who is the true inventor. Moreover,
many forms of indirect communication may qualify as other forms
of prior art if they are sufficiently public. The requirement for a
communication suggests that the message between the true
inventor and the deriver should be fairly direct. Nevertheless, acts
of derivation do not fit nicely into the possession paradigm because
388. By eliminating section 102(f) as a form of prior art, the AIA has likely created some
odd gaps in protection. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the
New Patent Act, 2011 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 12, 19-20.
389. § 102(b)(1)(A)-(2)(B).
390. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006).
391. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
393. See The Telephone Game, ICEBREAKER IDEAS (July 21, 2015), https://icebreakerideas.
com/telephone-game/ [https://perma.cc/8SHG-BQ66].
394. See supra note 128-36 and accompanying text.
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the communication between the two parties need not be public to
qualify.395
2. Earlier Filed Patent Applications as Prior Art
Under both the 1952 Patent Act and the AIA, an earlier patent
application serves as prior art, so long as it predates the invention
date or filing date, respectively, and is published or issues as a
patent.396 Section 102(e) of the 1952 Patent Act reflected Congress’s
codification397 of the Supreme Court decision in Alexander Milburn
Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co. that allowed an earlier patent appli-
cation to serve as prior art if filed prior to the invention date, so long
as that patent eventually issued.398 The rationale is that, in an ideal
world, the application would issue as a patent the moment the
application was filed, if deserving.399 In reality, examination of the
application takes time. According to the Supreme Court, delays at
the USPTO should not justify the awarding of a patent to a second
inventor.400 Once the United States began publishing patent
applications, Congress amended the statute to make publication a
trigger for the provision as well.401
The AIA extends this dynamic to the first-to-file context. Instead
of being tied to the invention date, the AIA precludes a patent on
the same invention or obvious variant thereof if someone else files
an application first, so long as that application eventually becomes
395. See supra note 374.
396. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).
397. See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 255 (1965) (“In its revision of
the patent laws in 1952, Congress showed its approval of the holding in Milburn by adopting
35 U.S.C. § 102(e).”).
398. 270 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1926) (holding patent application qualifies as a reference as of
its filing date for purposes of assessing novelty). Hazeltine extended the reasoning to the con-
text of non-obviousness. See 382 U.S. at 255-56 (“The basic reasoning upon which the Court
decided the Milburn case applies equally well here. When Wallace filed his application, he had
done what he could to add his disclosures to the prior art. The rest was up to the Patent
Office. Had the Patent Office acted faster, had it issued Wallace’s patent two months earlier,
there would have been no question here.”).
399. See Alexander Milburn, 270 U.S. at 401 (“The delays of the patent office ought not to
cut down the effect of what has been done.”).
400. Id.
401. Sean A. Passino et al., Foreign-Filed PCT Applications: An Asymmetrical Patent-
Defeating Effect, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 874, 875 (2003).
2018] PATENT PRIOR ART AND POSSESSION 181
public through publication or issuance.402 The same reasoning ap-
plies: delays at the USPTO should not result in two parties getting
a patent on essentially the same invention.403
These provisions are consistent with each Act’s respective
awarding of the patent to the first to invent or first to file. One
cannot be said to be the first to invent if someone filed an applica-
tion on identical or obvious subject matter before the invention date
of a competing applicant, and one cannot be the first to file if, in
fact, she is the second.
These provisions do not map well onto a possession-based view of
prior art. Possession theory requires open communication to third
parties.404 Of course, these provisions do require an act of publica-
tion, either through the application being published or the patent
issuing.405 As such, calling either the 1952 Patent Act a true “first
to invent” or the AIA a pure “first to file” regime is inaccurate.
Under both statutes, the act of filing does not disqualify the subse-
quent inventor or filer; there must also be an act of publication.406
The problem, however, is that the effective date as prior art under
these provisions is the filing date, not the date when the information
is communicated to the public.407 It has a nunc pro tunc effect. Some
have called these provisions “secret prior art” because the informa-
tion is not available to the public as of the invention or filing date.408
In terms of possession theory, these patents and applications should
be deemed prior art only as of their publication date—the date they
communicate information to the public.409 The relation back to the
application’s filing date creates an issue in terms of the communica-
tive requirement of possession theory.
These provisions are concerned with preserving the integrity of
the first-to-invent and first-to-file systems under the 1952 Patent
Act and the AIA, respectively. If these provisions did not exist, then
402. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012). 
403. Cf. supra notes 399-400.
404. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
405. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).
406. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).
407. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (2012).
408. In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 537 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“In other words, we will extend the
‘secret prior art’ doctrine of Milburn and Hazeltine only as far as we are required to do so by
the logic of those cases.”).
409. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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multiple patents might issue on identical or similar inventions. One
option to deal with this scenario, consistent with possession theory,
would be to relegate these provisions for use only in proceedings
within the USPTO.410 These provisions would be unavailable in
litigation to invalidate the patent as forms of prior art.411
Such an approach is not unprecedented. Congress embraced a
similar administrative versus litigation dichotomy in 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g)(1). This provision allows an inventor to use overseas
inventive activity to demonstrate that she was the first to invent.412
Historically, only inventive activity within the United States could
be used to prove that someone was the first to invent. Section
102(g)(1) modified this rule, but only partially.413 Under sections
102(g)(1) and 104, foreign activity can be used in administrative
proceedings at the USPTO in disputes over who should receive the
patent.414
However, such foreign activity cannot be used in litigation to
invalidate a patent. For example, if someone could prove she was
the first to invent in Hungary, she would win the interference battle
among competing patent applicants by relying on her activity in
Hungary. That activity, however, could not be used to invalidate a
patent in litigation; only inventive acts in the United States could
be used as prior art.
A similar approach can also be seen with respect to derivation
under the AIA. Derivation is no longer a form of prior art.415 Instead,
under the AIA, issues of derivation are dealt with through proceed-
410. See generally § 135 (detailing the process for derivation proceedings in the office).
411. But see Sean B. Seymore, When Patents Claim Preexisting Knowledge, 50 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1965, 1982 (2017) (“It is hard to understand why manuscripts should be treated differ-
ently than patent documents. I urge that they should not; manuscripts should be effective as
prior art as of their submission date as long as the manuscript eventually publishes.”).
412. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2006) (referencing 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2006)). Section 104 of the
1952 Patent Act allowed the use of foreign inventive activity in countries that are signatories
to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) for the purposes of interferences under section 102(g)(1). Id. § 104; see
also MUELLER, supra note 13, at 294 (“[Section 104] permits the use of evidence of inventive
activity ... that occurred on or after December 8, 1993, in countries that are signatories to
[NAFTA] ... and on or after January 1, 1996, in countries that are members of the [WTO].”). 
413. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
414. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 377-79 and accompanying text.
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ings at the USPTO or in the courts.416 Derivative acts are no longer
available in litigation, however, as a form a prior art that could
invalidate a patent.417 One could readily envision a similar function
for the provisions dealing with earlier filed patent applications.
* * * 
Both acts of derivation and earlier filed patent applications do not
fit well into a definition of prior art that utilizes a possession-
paradigm. Neither may be available at the time of invention or
filing, thus not satisfying the communicative function necessary for
an act of possession.418 Indeed, both of these forms of prior art are
more concerned with protecting the integrity of the patent filing
system as opposed to assessing the publicly known state of the art.
Both of these concerning forms of prior art could be limited to use
within the administrative processes of the USPTO.419 In other
words, earlier filed patent applications could be used to deny
patents to subsequent filers, particularly in a first-to-file regime, or
to applicants who stole the idea. Indeed, derivation only operates
through exclusions now; it is not technically a form of prior art.420
Thus, a possession-based system of prior art could accommodate
these concerns in a narrower fashion at the USPTO and perhaps
specialized court proceedings. They would not be deemed prior art
in the classic sense, however, and could not be used to invalidate a
patent in subsequent litigation.
IV. WHAT WOULD A TRUE POSSESSION-BASED PRIOR ART REGIME
LOOK LIKE ... AND WOULD WE WANT IT?
As a result of the above analysis, we can easily envision a
possession-based prior art regime that diverges from the approaches
in the 1952 Patent Act and the AIA. A truly possession-based
approach would mean that third-party forms of prior art would need
416. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012).
417. See supra notes 377-80 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
419. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 135 (detailing the process for derivation proceedings in the
office).
420. See supra notes 377-79 and accompanying text.
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to be publicly accessible.421 In terms of printed publications, one
could quibble with the current law, arguing that its view of public
accessibility is too capacious. Nevertheless, little if any change
would need to be made doctrinally for those forms of prior art. In
contrast, public uses and sales activity would also have to be
publicly accessible, meaning that noninforming public uses and
secret sales would not qualify as prior art. Thus, the possession-
based approach offers support for those advocating for change under
the AIA for a public accessibility requirement.422
As for inventor-generated prior art, the definition of prior art
depends on the policy choice of forcing the inventor to disclose her
invention sooner rather than later.423 If one were to take a robust,
statute of limitations view of inventor-based prior art, one could
advocate for the rejection of any sort of public accessibility require-
ment. I do not go so far. Minimally, such an approach is inconsistent
with the clear language of both statutes. Moreover, if we consider
the inventor’s activity to be potential prior art against other parties,
then we may prefer to have symmetry in obligations. The system
would consistently and uniformly treat all prior art in the same
fashion, requiring public accessibility, regardless of the source of the
information. The important line to draw in both circumstances
would be between public and noninforming uses, not the current
line between noninforming and secret uses.424 Secret sales would
also not qualify as prior art, lending support to interpreting the AIA
in this fashion, but only if we were to revisit the seminal Supreme
Court cases from the 1952 Patent Act.
The “secret” prior art—derivation and earlier filed applica-
tions425—could be eliminated as prior art for litigation purposes.
Instead, they would be limited to the USPTO’s administrative
421. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
422. To be clear, I disagree with the arguments made by the parties in support of such a
change. Congress used the same terms in the AIA as are found in the 1952 Patent Act. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text. By using those terms, Congress seemingly intended to
incorporate the case law interpreting those provisions into the AIA. See supra notes 324-26
and accompanying text. Thus, I think the AIA has not changed the law as a matter of
statutory interpretation. That said, my analysis, while taking me down an uncomfortable
path, suggests that earlier judicial decisions like Egbert and Metallizing were wrongly
decided. 
423. See supra notes 215-17.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 215-17.
425. See supra Parts III.C.1 and III.C.2.
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proceedings in order to preserve the first-to-invent426 and first-to-
file427 regimes of the respective statutes. There is a risk, of course,
that the USPTO could miss some of these activities, resulting in the
issuance of duplicative patents. But various post-grant administra-
tive procedures could be used to fill any gaps that arise during the
application process.428
A. Advantages of a Possession-Based Prior Art System
Is this a regime we would really want? The advantage of a
possession-based system is that it would create theoretical and
doctrinal consistency across prior art definitions. One could more
readily assess whether something should qualify as prior art or not.
In the close cases, the possession account of prior art offers guide-
posts for determining whether some source of information should
qualify as prior art. There would also be a greater focus on public
accessibility and search costs.429
The possession-based system consequently results in a more
search-cost focused prior art system. A reference would only qualify
as prior art if it were publicly available in ways that would avoid
surprise outcomes in litigation.430 Generally, forms of prior art that
would be effectively impossible to find absent the power of discovery
would no longer qualify.431 The universe of prior art would be more
readily ascertainable. The possession framework should thus reduce
the costs and risks of prior art searching, enhancing certainty for
patent applicants.
For a potential patent applicant, such enhanced certainty would
be advantageous. She would be more confident that she had dis-
covered all the possible invalidating references, and could have
more certainty in ascertaining whether to file the application and
anticipating potential obstacles she might face navigating the
USPTO prosecution process. And, if the patent issues, she is less
likely to lose the patent based on prior art that generally would
426. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e)-(g) (2006).
427. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
428. See, e.g., supra notes 415-16 and accompanying text.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 327-38.
430. See supra Parts III.A.1.d-A.3.
431. See supra text accompanying note 161.
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have been difficult, if not impossible, to uncover outside of the
litigation context. Similarly, those evaluating existing patents for
clearance purposes would have a better sense of their likelihood of
invalidating the patent. Search costs should be reduced, which
generally should lead to a more efficient patent system.
Finally, the various forms of “secret prior art”432 would be
eliminated, removing a potentially unforeseen landmine to an in-
ventor’s application. Instead, concerns with derivation and earlier
filed patent applications would be handled within the USPTO
through administrative procedures.433 This approach is already
present in the AIA, with derivation no longer serving as a form of
prior art.434 Instead issues of derivation are addressed through
derivation proceedings.435 For derivative acts and earlier filed
applications, the USPTO would police the system, particularly to
ensure that the first inventor to file is awarded the patent. Such
applications could not be used in litigation, however. Instead, these
issues would have to be resolved in Inter Partes Review (IPR) or
Post Grant Review (PGR) proceedings.436
B. Potential Objections to Possession-Based Prior Art
Of course, persons could raise a variety of objections to such a
system based on potential collateral consequences arising in such a
regime. The possession approach requires a greater emphasis on the
public availability of a given reference.437 Because certain activities,
such as secret sales and noninforming public uses, would no longer
qualify as prior,438 the universe of prior art would necessarily be
reduced.
432. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
433. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 377-81 and accompanying text.
435. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012) (outlining the process for derivation proceedings).
436. See generally Inter Partes Review, USPTO (July 17, 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review [https://
perma.cc/GG4R-WXX7] (describing Inter Partes Review); Post Grant Review, USPTO (July
17, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/
trials/post-grant-review [https://perma.cc/3FDD-LB9A] (describing Post Grant Review).
437. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
438. See supra text accompanying notes 244-45.
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The shrinkage of prior art could result in two outcomes in the
margins. First, in the face of less prior art, more patents may issue
and survive validity challenges. The examiner during the applica-
tion process would have less material to reject applications as
lacking novelty or as being obvious. It would be conceivable, there-
fore, that more patents could issue. If there is a belief that there are
too many patents issuing, particularly of suspect quality, then this
could be deemed problematic.439
Second and relatedly, patent applicants may be able to obtain
patents of broader scope. A key constraint on the scope of a patent
is the prior art because the patent clearly cannot ensnare the prior
art.440 With less prior art, a patent applicant may be able to claim
more broadly with less fear of running into the prior art. Marginally
enhanced patent scope could be of concern if one believes that
patents should generally be of narrow scope.441 Of course, from the
perspective of prospect and commercialization theory, broader
patent scope may be laudable.442 Under these theories, patent
holders should be afforded broad patent protection to coordinate
subsequent improvements on the technology and to control its com-
mercialization.443 They would also have more power to coordinate
downstream improvements in the invention.444 The resulting
broadening of patent scope may be an outcome to a possession-based
prior art system, though whether that is normatively attractive
depends on what priors a given commentator may have about the
patent system.
439. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Decreasing the Patent Office’s
Incentives to Grant Invalid Patents, BROOKINGS: THE HAMILTON PROJECT 3 (Dec. 2017), http://
www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/decreasing_patent_office_incentives_grant_invalid_p
atents.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E8K-UAHA]; Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many
Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/ [https://perma.cc/WBA4-HHVX].
440. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (“[A] patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents,
coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims.”). 
441. See, e.g., Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron
Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1201-02 (2008).
442. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 753 (2001); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977).
443. See Kieff, supra note 442, at 753; Kitch, supra note 442, at 266.
444. See Kieff, supra note 442, at 720, 722 n.113, 726; Kitch, supra note 442, at 276.
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Finally, and likely the biggest objection to the possession para-
digm, would be the loss of the various policies that underlie current
doctrines.445 To embrace a robust, possession-based approach risks
undermining those policies. Requiring public accessibility could
permit inventors to game the system by retaining aspects of their
invention from the public view while still utilizing and commercial-
izing them. Egbert is an example of such a dynamic.446 The incentive
to encourage inventors to promptly file their applications would be
undermined, unless of course a strict statute of limitations period
were utilized in lieu of the class possession approach. Moreover, as
recognized in Egbert, there could simply be certain classes of inven-
tions for which public use might simply be impossible, allowing
considerable arbitrage of the patent system.447 The possession
approach would alter the doctrines that have evolved to deal with
such concerns.
C. Conclusion—A Possession-Based Approach Seems More
Attractive
Concerns with a possession-based approach are legitimate. We
would forfeit certain aspects of current doctrine that are based on
certain policy interests. However, the extent to which such arbitrage
happens is not clear.448 Indeed, it assumes that many innovators are
familiar with how the patent system operates.449 It also runs counter
to a concern that patentees actually have incentives to file patent
applications too early.450 To engage in such arbitrage, an applicant
necessarily would delay filing an application in order to exploit the
invention for a period of time before filing, effectively extending the
term of the subsequent patent.451 Yet many commentators have
bemoaned the opposite dynamic: inventors are filing applications
445. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.1.d.
446. See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1881).
447. Id. at 336.
448. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.1.d.
449. See Janis & Holbrook, supra note 233, at 74.
450. See infra note 452 and accompanying text.
451. Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he overriding focus
of section 102(b) is preventing inventors from reaping the benefits of the patent system be-
yond the statutory term.”); see also Holbrook, supra note 55, at 944 (noting the on-sale bar is
concerned with “effectively extending the patent term”). 
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prematurely on underdeveloped or unproven inventions.452 It may
actually be advantageous to put the brakes on such filings.453 As
such, the concerns of such game-playing may be overblown.
Delaying applications could actually be advantageous.
The possession-based system would create coherency that the law
is currently lacking.454 With a proper framework, hopefully courts
delineate lines of precedent that facilitate greater understanding of
what constitutes prior art. More optimistically, persons performing
prior art searches in anticipation of filing patent applications or
assessing the patent landscape before entering into a particular
venture will have clearer, hopefully simpler rules for assessing
patentability. Given the potential for lesser search costs and greater
coherency,455 a possession-based system seems quite laudable.
V. WHAT DOES POSSESSION IN THE PATENT LAW CONTEXT
ADD TO THE PROPERTY-BASED POSSESSION LITERATURE?
The above discussion reveals an aspect of possession with which
the property literature has not fully engaged: the sufficiency of the
act of communication. In other words, how “public” does the act need
to be? In many of the canonical examples—fox hunting,456 manure
gathering457—the acts are quite public such that the sufficiency of
the communication was generally not at issue.
Or so it may seem. In Pierson v. Post, the determinative holding
is that Pierson won because he killed the fox.458 Possession is
clear.459 But the broader discussion of what acts would be sufficient
at least pose issues of the sufficiency of the act to communicate
possession to other parties.460 For example, the court concluded that
452. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 65, 67, 69 (2009); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1459, 1487, 1499 (2016); Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1173
(2016); Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 868-69
(2017). 
453. See Cotropia, supra note 452, at 69-70.
454. See supra Part I.A; see also supra text accompanying notes 358-59.
455. See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
456. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
457. See Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 505 (1871).
458. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 178.
459. Id.
460. Cf. Smith, supra note 123, at 82 (“It may well be that hunters among themselves
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trapping the animal or mortally wounding it while in pursuit were
sufficient.461 Finding a trapped animal would likely inform an
ordinary person that someone has asserted dominion over the
animal.462
The requirement for mortal wounding while in pursuit,463 though,
poses different challenges. Both conditions may not be apparent to
an ordinary observer. For example, how does someone encountering
a wounded animal know whether the wound is mortal? An ordinary
person likely could not discern the difference between a particularly
bloody yet nonmortal wound and a mortal one. Similarly, the
requirement for pursuit may entail assessments of how close is close
enough in a hunting context. For this aspect of possession, the
identity of the audience becomes important. The court may implic-
itly have had an “expert” audience in mind—other hunters.464 But,
if that was truly the case, then perhaps the dissent’s view should
have prevailed: either leave it to the hunters to decide under their
own customs, or award the fox to the person having a reasonable
prospect of taking it.465 Hunters may be able to make that assess-
ment more readily than ordinary persons.466 Seemingly, pursuit
alone would have been sufficient within the norms of the hunting
community.467
This issue of sufficiency is contingent on whom we believe to be
the relevant audience. As Henry Smith has explained, “[p]ossession
law, like all law, is a form of communication and as such faces a
trade-off: one can communicate in an intensive way with a more
intimate audience or in a less information-dense way with a more
extensive audience.”468 For some acts of possession, the appropriate
audience likely is the general public. Pierson v. Post, though, sug-
might recognize rights of one in hot pursuit of a fox. The question is whether nonhunters
should be held to know this.”). 
461. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 178.
462. Anyone except Kramer from Seinfeld. See Seinfeld: The Hamptons, IMDB, https://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0697707/ [https://perma.cc/3LTG-JT9D]. 
463. See Pierson, 3 Cai. at 178-79.
464. Cf. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1263 (2014) (observing that patent claims are
addressed to an “expert” audience).
465. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
466. Id.
467. See id.
468. Smith, supra note 123, at 81.
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gests the audience may be a more select group of interested par-
ties—other hunters.469
While Pierson and Haslem do not wrestle with the issue of the
sufficiency of the communication to the audience,470 this concern is
more readily addressed in the literature471 and in other cases, par-
ticularly those involving the importation of norms and conventions
into formal law.472 This dynamic is seen more explicitly in the
various whaling cases.473
Consider Ghen v. Rich, involving the ownership of a deceased fin-
back whale that washed ashore on Cape Cod.474 Because fin-back
whales sank when harpooned and killed, a norm developed on Cape
Cod where persons who found the whale carcass would contact per-
sons in Provincetown so that the owner could collect the whale.475
The owner would often compensate the finder as well.476 In violation
of this norm, Ellis found the whale and attempted to sell it.477
Although it seems Ellis may have been aware of this convention—
and he ultimately lost478—one can easily envision a scenario where
a finder is unaware of the convention. In other words, the finder is
not part of the audience and thus does not understand the commu-
nication of possession.
As Thomas Merrill has noted,
In many cases, the relevant communicative act is self-evident....
Often this will be an act that easily is understood as such a sig-
nal, such as an employee locking the door when leaving. Other
symbolic acts, like draping a coat over the back of a seat in the
theater, require some cultural knowledge. Consequently, the
469. See Pierson, 3 Cai. at 180-81.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 130-45, 458-67.
471. See, e.g., infra note 493.
472. See infra notes 473-79 and accompanying text.
473. See Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559 (D. Mass. 1872); Bartlett v. Budd, 2 F. Cas.
966, 966 (D. Mass. 1868); Taber v. Jenny, 23 F. Cas. 605, 606 (D. Mass. 1856).
474. 8 F. 159, 160 (D. Mass. 1881).
475. Id. at 159-60.
476. Id. at 160.
477. Id.
478. Id. (“Neither the respondent nor Ellis knew the whale had been killed by the libellant,
but they knew or might have known, if they had wished, that it had been shot and killed with
a bomb-lance, by some person engaged in this species of business.”). 
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precise actions that signal an intention to establish or remain in
possession will turn on local custom, at least to some degree.479
The audience, therefore, matters.
In this regard, patent law may have a leg up on property law.
Patent law has long embraced a construct to deal with this audience
issue: the person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA).480 As
patent law’s “reasonable person,” the PHOSITA provides the lens
for many important doctrines, such as claim construction, the
doctrine of equivalents, and whether something qualifies as prior
art.481 The PHOSITA can act as a bridge between formal legal rules
and the relevant audience for patent law.482
The PHOSITA construct seems appropriate for published docu-
ments, as the accessibility of such documents should depend on a
knowledgeable artisan performing a literature search. We would ex-
pect someone with technical facilities who is engaging in innovation
to be familiar with the literature in her field.483 In measuring
whether a given patent or prior art reference would generally be
publicly accessible, the PHOSITA provides a helpful heuristic.484
She would be aware of a variety of resources that a member of the
general public may not.485
But what about tangible forms of prior art, such as public uses
and sales? The PHOSITA may not be the right frame. She may not
479. Merrill, supra note 123, at 16.
480. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004) (discussing the role of the
PHOSITA in the obviousness analysis); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and
Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 781 (2011) (discussing the role of the PHOSITA in patent liti-
gation); Greg Reilly, Rethinking the PHOSITA in Patent Litigation, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 501
(2016). 
481. See Holbrook, supra note 34, at 10-11, 23, 24, 28.
482. Janis & Holbrook, supra note 233, at 96.
483. See, e.g., GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC, No. 2017-1894, 2018 WL 3596007,
at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2018) (“[A]lthough the general public at large may not have been
aware of the trade show, dealers of POV cameras would encompass the relevant audience
such that a person ordinarily skilled and interested in POV action cameras, exercising rea-
sonable diligence, should have been aware of the show.”); Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm.,
LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Whether the disseminated material is addressed
to or of interest to persons of ordinary skill is also relevant to the public accessibility in-
quiry.”).
484. Janis & Holbrook, supra note 233, at 90, 96.
485. See Reilly, supra note 480, at 509.
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know of others’ commercial activities, or whether some event
constituted a public attempt at commercializing an invention.486
Instead, it may be more appropriate to use the perspective of the
reasonable competitor, another construct that has appeared in U.S.
patent law.487 A competitor might have a better sense of market
activities, as opposed to a technologist who may not be concerned
with the commercial or public activity of potential competitors.
To inform the reasonable competitor construct, patent law may
want to turn to trade secrecy. Information can only qualify for trade
secrecy protection if it is truly a secret.488 In other words, the
information cannot be generally known or readily ascertainable.489
Such an assessment necessarily entails a consideration of the ap-
propriate audience: to whom is the information generally known or
ascertainable? Generally, the appropriate audience is not the gen-
eral public.490 But, in a competitive industry, various market players
likely have an idea of what is known across the industry.491 The
reasonable competitor is aware of events within the market and has
some level of technical sophistication to monitor tangible forms of
prior art.492 Patent law could likely be better informed by a greater
engagement with the law of trade secrecy in this regard.
Regardless, one can see that patent law has taken the issue of
audience seriously. Elsewhere, a coauthor and I have suggested that
proper constructs such as the PHOSITA can be used as a bridging
heuristic to deal with issues of complexity and proximity when it
comes to the law and its intended audience.493 Property law stands
486. See Eisenberg, supra note 480, at 893.
487. See, e.g., Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 826-27 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
488. See Enter. Leasing Co. of Phx. v. Ehmke, 3 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
489. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1986) [hereinafter UTSA]; RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
490. UTSA § 1 cmt. (“The language ‘not being generally known to and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by other persons’ does not require that information be gener-
ally known to the public for trade secret rights to be lost.”).
491. Id. (“If the principal persons who can obtain economic benefit from information are
aware of it, there is no trade secret. A method of casting metal, for example, may be unknown
to the general public but readily known within the foundry industry.”); see, e.g., Enter. Leasing
Co. of Phx., 3 P.3d at 1069.
492. See Janis & Holbrook, supra note 233, at 103-04.
493. See id. at 77-84; see also Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible
Processes: An Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 358-63 (2015).
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to gain much from recognizing the doctrinal and theoretical work
that has been done in this regard within patent law.494
CONCLUSION
Understanding what constitutes prior art has long been a vexing
problem for law students and practitioners. This Article has offered
a theoretical construction of prior art that would create greater
consistency and coherency to the doctrine. By using the conception
of possession from property law, one can see the importance of
public accessibility in defining what constitutes prior art as part of
the validity analysis. Even though possession in the property
context is a contested proposition, reliance on principles rooted in
possession promises to reduce search costs and generate more
certainty within the law.
This analysis is even more crucial as the courts begin to engage
with the AIA. Even though, as a statutory construction matter, I
believe that the AIA did not significantly alter the common law that
has developed to define prior art, it could create an appropriate
occasion for revisiting some of that precedent by the Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit. At a minimum, this Article details the
importance of audience in assessing prior art. It thus engages, and
elaborates, on the communicative function of patent law in a way
that should inform the broader debates in property law about
possession.
494. See generally Fromer & Lemley, supra note 464 (discussing the role of audiences in
IP law).
